Emory Law Journal
Volume 71

Issue 4

2022

The Property Clause, Article IV, and Constitutional Structure
Eric Biber

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/elj
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Eric Biber, The Property Clause, Article IV, and Constitutional Structure, 71 Emory L. J. 739 (2022).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/elj/vol71/iss4/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Emory Law Scholarly Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Emory Law Journal by an authorized editor of Emory Law Scholarly Commons. For
more information, please contact law-scholarly-commons@emory.edu.

BIBER_2.16.22

2/16/2022 3:02 PM

THE PROPERTY CLAUSE, ARTICLE IV, AND
CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE
Eric Biber
ABSTRACT
Federal public lands account for approximately thirty percent of the United
States and have been the grounds for fierce political and legal battles: whether
to lease those lands for the extraction of fossil fuels, whether to protect
landscapes and Native sacred sites as national monuments, whether federal law
on the public lands preempts state law, and even whether federal ownership of
lands within states is constitutional. Those battles turn on questions of executive
versus congressional power to control the management of the public lands, and
state versus federal authority on those lands. Answering those questions depends
on a proper understanding of federal power under the Property Clause—Article
IV, Section 3, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution—which empowers Congress to
“dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations” for the property of the
United States, including the public lands.
Scholars have debated the meaning of the Clause and how it might inform
separation-of-powers and federalism questions. But until now, they have not
considered in-depth the implications of the location of the Clause in Article IV
of the Constitution. Article IV’s provisions address interstate relationships,
generally mediated outside the federal government, as part of an effort to build
those relationships and advance a stronger Union. The history of the drafting of
the Property Clause shows that, while the Clause authorizes a powerful role for
the federal government in managing the public lands, the Clause was intended
to resolve interstate disputes among the original thirteen states as to western
land claims and the creation of new western states.
This understanding of Article IV as a “horizontal federalism” Article
focused on interstate relations leads to important conclusions as to how to
properly understand the Property Clause. It supports emphasizing
congressional primacy in implementing the Clause—although this
congressional primacy is moderated by the recognition of a necessary executive
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power that has discretion to manage the public lands where Congress is silent.
This understanding also supports a strong federal role vis-à-vis states in the
management and retention of public lands within those states. The Article
applies these principles to resolve key disputes over public lands management,
such as executive power to revoke national monuments or terminate existing
fossil fuel leases, and claims that federal power over public lands should be
constrained or even eliminated. It also identifies how a “horizontal federalism”
understanding of Article IV could resolve other important questions about how
to interpret the Property Clause and other provisions of Article IV.
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INTRODUCTION
In early 2021, the Biden administration froze issuance of all new oil and gas
leases on federal lands in the United States as part of an aggressive climate
effort.1 That step triggered political pushback on the grounds that the freeze
exceeded executive power under the statutes that guide development of fossil
fuels on federal lands.2
Just four years earlier, the Trump administration unilaterally scaled back
national monuments that had been proclaimed by Presidents Obama and Clinton
on federal public lands in Utah.3 National monument designation can restrict the
development of public lands for resource extraction, including minerals, oil, and
gas.4 The Trump administration was sued for overreach, on the grounds that it
had exceeded its powers under the relevant statutory schemes.5
In early 2016, armed groups occupied a federal national wildlife refuge in
southeastern Oregon, contending that the federal government had no power to
retain land ownership in the western United States and that the millions of acres
of federal lands in the West—including national parks and national forests—
should be turned over to the states, counties, or private parties.6 The occupation
ended in violence and death.7 The legal arguments behind it have a long
preceding history, including threats of litigation by the state of Utah to force the

1
See Exec. Order No. 14,008, 86 Fed. Reg. 7,619 (Jan. 27, 2021). That freeze was enjoined in the
summer of 2021 by a federal district court on the grounds that the freeze violated federal laws mandating a
minimum amount of oil and gas development on federal lands. See Niina H. Farah & Heather Richards, Federal
Judge Overturns Oil Leasing Freeze in Blow to Biden, POLITICO: E&E NEWS (June 16, 2021, 7:16 AM),
https://subscriber.politicopro.com/article/eenews/1063735105.
2
See Emma Dumain, Biden Drilling Order Sparks Legislative Backlash, POLITICO: E&E NEWS (Jan. 29,
2021, 6:53 AM), http://subscriber.politicopro.com/article/eenews/1063723841.
3
See Richard Gonzales, Kirk Siegler & Colin Dwyer, Trump Orders Largest National Monument
Reduction in U.S. History, NPR (Dec. 4, 2017, 5:14 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/12/04/
567803476/trump-dramatically-shrinks-2-utah-national-monuments.
4
See infra Part III.A.
5
See, e.g., Complaint at 3–4, Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Trump, No. 17-cv-2606 (D.D.C. Dec. 7, 2017).
6
Kirk Johnson, Trial to Begin in Standoff at Oregon Wildlife Refuge, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/13/us/oregon-malheur-wildlife-refuge-bundy.html.
7
Julie Turkewitz & Kirk Johnson, Ammon Bundy and 7 Oregon Protestors Held; LaVoy Finicum is
Reported Dead, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/27/us/oregon-armed-grouparrest-bundy.html.
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transfer of federal public lands to Utah8 and prior political claims for state or
local government ownership of federal lands.9
States like California and Oregon have sought to restrict mining activities on
federal lands that they believe cause significant environmental harms—in
particular, mining for gold in streambeds.10 Those states passed laws restricting
or temporarily prohibiting gold mining on riverbeds in their states. Mining
groups challenged the laws as preempted by federal law.11
These different conflicts—all with varying policy and ideological
valences—are examples of the many disputes over the management of the
almost thirty percent of the country owned and managed by the United States.12
These disputes date back to the first days of the federal government in the late
eighteenth century and have real policy stakes—touching climate change, the
conservation of lands sacred to Native American communities and important for
biodiversity, the relationship of the federal government to states in the West, and
the protection of water quality.
Resolving these legal and policy disputes implicates constitutional law, as
applied through the Property Clause, the constitutional provision that is the basis
for most federal land management and ownership in the United States.13 Does
the Clause authorize federal law that preempts state law? Does it authorize
8
Transfer of Public Lands Act and Related Study, H.B. 148, 2012 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2012); Debbie
Hummel, Utah Demands Federal Government Return Public Lands to State, REUTERS (Mar. 23, 2012,
11:50 PM), http://reuters.com/article/us-utah-lands/utah-demands-federal-government-return-public-lands-tostate-idUSBRE82N03420120324. For legal analysis supporting Utah’s claims, see generally DONALD J.
KOCHAN, A LEGAL OVERVIEW OF UTAH’S HB 148–THE TRANSFER OF PUBLIC LANDS ACT (2013) [hereinafter
KOCHAN, A LEGAL OVERVIEW], https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2200471; JOHN W.
HOWARD, JAMES S. JARDINE, RONALD D. ROTUNDA, RICHARD SEAMON & GEORGE R. WENTZ, JR., LEGAL
ANALYSIS OF THE LEGAL CONSULTING SERVICES TEAM PREPARED FOR THE UTAH COMMISSION FOR THE
STEWARDSHIP OF PUBLIC LANDS (2015), https://www.congress.gov/116/meeting/house/110088/documents/
HHRG-116-II13-20191017-SD046.pdf; Donald J. Kochan, Public Lands and the Federal Government’s
Compact-Based “Duty to Dispose”: A Case Study of Utah’s H.B. 148—The Transfer of Public Lands Act, 2013
BYU L. REV. 1133 (2013) [hereinafter Kochan, “Duty to Dispose”].
9
John D. Leshy, Are U.S. Public Lands Unconstitutional?, 69 HASTINGS L.J. 499, 574–75 (2018).
10
See Jonathan Rosenthal, People v. Rinehart: No Preemption of State Environmental Regulations Under
the Mining Act of 1872, 44 ECOLOGY L.Q. 555, 557 (2017).
11
See Sean Hecht, California Supreme Court Holds Unanimously that the State May Restrict Mining
Methods on Federal Lands, LEGALPLANET (Aug. 22, 2016), https://legal-planet.org/2016/08/22/californiasupreme-court-holds-unanimously-that-the-state-may-restrict-mining-methods-on-federal-lands/; Bohmker v.
Oregon, 903 F.3d 1029, 1031 (9th Cir. 2018).
12
See CONG. RSCH. SERV., FEDERAL LAND OWNERSHIP: OVERVIEW AND DATA 1 (2020), https://sgp.fas.
org/crs/misc/R42346.pdf.
13
See, e.g., Kochan, “Duty to Dispose,” supra note 8, at 1136 (stating that the legality of federal
ownership of public lands “depends, in large part, on the proper interpretation of the Property Clause in the
Constitution”); U.S. CONST. art. 4, § 3, cl. 2.
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federal land ownership within states? And what is the relationship between
executive and congressional power in the implementation of the Clause?
The disputes about the meaning of the Property Clause and its relationship
to the sovereignty of states have ramifications beyond the Clause itself.
Arguments about the constitutionality of federal land ownership within states
depend in part on the “equal footing” doctrine, a doctrine developed by the
Supreme Court to limit the extent to which Congress can leverage its power over
the admission of states so as to deprive those new states of equality in key
components of their political sovereignty.14 Recently, the Supreme Court has
controversially extended this case law to produce an “equal sovereignty”
doctrine that required striking down a key provision of the Voting Rights Act on
the grounds that the Act improperly treated states differently.15
This Article puts the Property Clause in a broader constitutional context by
explaining how the Clause’s history, text, structure, and placement in Article IV
of the Constitution can help answer these difficult questions. The Clause was
intended to resolve a dispute between states over conflicting claims to western
lands after the American Revolution, responding to a major gap in the Articles
of Confederation.16 The Clause empowers the federal government to have
meaningful sovereignty in its management of those lands, ensuring that the
federal government can prevent interstate disputes and facilitate the
development of new, independent states. This role for the federal government as
a neutral party between disputing states also means that it owns and manages the
public lands for all Americans—whether in new states or old, whether in states
that had western claims or no claims at all. This role does not change simply
because the federal government owns land within the borders of a state.
Accordingly, the Clause can be best understood as authorizing federal land
ownership in states and authorizing federal preemption of contrary state law.
The Clause’s text allocates management power to Congress, implying
congressional primacy in management of federal lands vis-à-vis the Executive.
The structure of Article IV further supports this reading. While the first three
Articles of the Constitution create the structure for the nascent federal
government, Article IV does something very different. All provisions of Article
IV attempt to deepen the relationships between the component states in the

14
For example, the Court struck down a law that constrained where the newly admitted state of Oklahoma
could locate its state capitol. Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 574 (1911).
15
Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 542 (2013).
16
See infra Part II.A.
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Union, also known as “horizontal federalism.”17 Facilitating deeper state-tostate relationships can involve connections directly between state
governments—for example, in the extradition of a fugitive of justice from one
state to another. Or it can involve connections between the residents or citizens
of the separate states—connections made through interstate travel and
commerce that in turn are facilitated by requiring states to grant equivalent
privileges and immunities to residents of other states. Horizontal federalism may
be advanced without any explicit mediating role by the federal government, as
in the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause, which simply requires that
citizens of one state “shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of the
Citizens in the several States.”18 Or, alternatively, there might be a role for the
federal government in advancing interstate connections, such as the
empowerment of Congress to implement the Full Faith and Credit Clause, which
ensures that judgments in one state are recognized in another state.19 Regardless,
deepening relationships between states can help build a stronger Union
independent of the creation of a central government.
In contrast, “vertical federalism” focuses on the creation of a federal
government that acts as a unitary entity for the United States as a whole.20
Vertical federalism entails the development of a federal government for the
nation—a government that is selected at least in part independently from the
individual states, that undertakes actions (such as in the realm of foreign affairs)
that are reserved to the nation and not the states, and that is a governmental
institution separate from the state governments. Vertical federalism can play a
role in advancing horizontal federalism. For instance, the strong federal power
under the Property Clause helps advance the horizontal federalism goals of
Article IV, given the role the Clause played in resolving interstate disputes over
western land claims. But vertical federalism often acts to advance a unitary
national government (for example, the relations of the United States with foreign
nations, in which states do not participate).
The clear text of the Clause and Article IV’s focus on “horizontal
federalism” creates a strong argument for the primacy of congressional
implementation of the Property Clause. Congress is a representative of states in
a way that the President is not—and as a “horizontal federalism” article, Article
IV requires a focus on interstate relations. Disposal of the public lands—the
17
For prior scholarship using this term to reflect state-to-state relationships in U.S. constitutional law,
see infra note 105.
18
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
19
Id. § 1.
20
See, e.g., Allan Erbsen, Horizontal Federalism, 93 MINN. L. REV. 493, 494 (2008).
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lands entrusted to the federal government by cessions from states as part of a
resolution of interstate disputes or that were obtained by the efforts of the states
together—therefore should require clear authorization by the congressional
representatives of those states.
There are necessary limits to congressional primacy in the context of the
Property Clause, however. The day-to-day management of those lands requires
many individual decisions by the Executive Branch, decisions that Congress will
rarely have the capacity to resolve ex ante through legislation. Thus, the
management (and protection) of those lands will require some inherent
discretion by the Executive. This managerial discretion is a counterpoint to a
“horizontal federalism” understanding of congressional supremacy under
Article IV.
This Article is the first to draw on a systematic analysis of Article IV as a
whole and its place in the overall structure of the Constitution and to use that
analysis to resolve crucial constitutional questions about the scope and
application of the Property Clause. There is a wide range of literature examining
the scope of federal power under the Clause, but it has not engaged in-depth with
the implications of the Clause’s inclusion within Article IV.21 Nor has that
literature generally engaged with how the text of the Clause and its location
within Article IV might shape our understandings of the boundary between

21
For prior literature examining the Property Clause with respect to executive versus congressional
power, see generally David H. Getches, Managing the Public Lands: The Authority of the Executive to Withdraw
Lands, 22 NAT. RES. J. 279 (1982); Harold H. Bruff, Executive Power and the Public Lands, 76 U. COLO. L.
REV. 503 (2005); John Yoo & Todd Gaziano, Presidential Authority to Revoke or Reduce National Monument
Designations, 35 YALE J. ON REGUL. 617 (2018); John D. Leshy, A Property Clause for the Twenty-First
Century, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 1101 (2004); Eugene R. Gaetke, Congressional Discretion Under the Property
Clause, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 381 (1981) [hereinafter Gaetke, Congressional Discretion]. For prior literature
examining the power of the federal government with respect to states under the Property Clause, see generally
Leshy, supra note 9; Dale D. Goble, The Myth of the Classic Property Clause Doctrine, 63 DENV. U. L. REV.
495 (1986); Eugene R. Gaetke, Refuting the “Classic” Property Clause Theory, 63 N.C. L. REV. 617 (1985)
[hereinafter Gaetke, Refuting]; Robert G. Natelson, Federal Land Retention and the Constitution’s Property
Clause: The Original Understanding, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 327 (2005); Kochan, “Duty to Dispose,” supra note
8; Jeffrey M. Schmitt, Limiting the Property Clause, 20 NEV. L.J. 145 (2019) [hereinafter Schmitt, Limiting the
Property Clause]; David E. Engdahl, State and Federal Power over Federal Property, 18 ARIZ. L. REV. 283
(1976); Robert E. Hardwicke, Carl Illig & C. Perry Patterson, The Constitution and the Continental Shelf, 26
TEX. L. REV. 398 (1948); C. Perry Patterson, The Relation of the Federal Government to the Territories and the
States in Landholding, 28 TEX. L. REV. 43 (1950); Jeffrey Schmitt, A Historical Reassessment of Congress’s
“Power to Dispose of” the Public Lands, 42 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 453 (2018); Peter A. Appel, The Power of
Congress “Without Limitation”: The Property Clause and Federal Regulation of Private Property, 86 MINN. L.
REV. 1 (2001); Albert W. Brodie, A Question of Enumerated Powers: Constitutional Issues Surrounding the
Federal Ownership of the Public Lands, 12 PAC. L.J. 693 (1981); Carolyn M. Landever, Whose Home on the
Range? Equal Footing, the New Federalism and State Jurisdiction on Public Lands, 47 FLA. L. REV. 557 (1995).
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executive and congressional power under the Property Clause.22 And while
scholars have examined Article IV as a whole, the most significant work has
focused on other topics besides the Property Clause, such as congressional
power to implement specific clauses in the Article.23
Part I of this Article provides an overview of the Property Clause and the
disputes about executive and federal power under the Clause, using the specifics
of the fights over national monuments, federal fossil fuel leasing, preemption of
state law, and divestment of federal lands within states. Part II contains the heart
of the constitutional contributions of the piece: an overview of the historical
context of the Property Clause; an understanding of Article IV as a separate and
coherent component of the Constitution in ways that are meaningful for
constitutional interpretation; and an explanation of the need for residual
executive discretion to manage the day-to-day decisions of the public lands.
Part III applies the theory developed in Part II to the problems identified in
Part I. It identifies a key distinction between the revocation of national
monuments and the termination of future or current oil and gas leases—the
former allows for divestiture of interests in public lands while the latter does not.
That distinction is crucial because divestiture of federal ownership of lands is a
step that should require a clear congressional authorization for executive action
to occur—a principle long recognized as a matter of statutory interpretation by
the courts. The text of the Clause and the “horizontal federalism” nature of
Article IV provide a constitutional grounding for this statutory interpretation
principle. However, the need for executive management discretion is more
22
The placement of the Clause in Article IV has generally been mentioned only in passing while
discussing the Clause and its interpretation. See GARY LAWSON & GUY SEIDMAN, THE CONSTITUTION OF
EMPIRE: TERRITORIAL EXPANSION AND AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 27–29 (2004) (rejecting an interpretation of
the Clause as the primary basis for congressional spending powers because of its placement in Article IV as
opposed to Article I); Lance F. Sorenson, The Hybrid Nature of the Property Clause: Implications for Judicial
Review of National Monument Reductions, 21 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 761, 781 (2019) (noting briefly the placement
of the Clause in Article IV as opposed to Article I as a basis for the argument that executive decisions under the
Clause should be shielded from judicial review); Robert L. Glicksman, Severability and the Realignment of the
Balance of Power over the Public Lands: The Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 After the
Legislative Veto Decisions, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 59 n.360 (1984) (noting and rejecting the argument that
placement of the Clause in Article IV might affect the constitutionality of legislative veto provisions for laws
enacted pursuant to the Clause). A few scholars have argued, without much detailed analysis, that the placement
of the Clause in Article IV supports divestiture of federal ownership of public lands within states. See Landever,
supra note 21, at 577; Brodie, supra note 21, at 719–21.
23
See generally Gillian E. Metzger, Congress, Article IV, and Interstate Relations, 120 HARV. L. REV.
1468 (2007) (exploring congressional power under the Article); JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, UNIFYING THE NATION:
ARTICLE IV OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (2015) (providing an overview of the implementation of the
Article). For an example of scholarship that has focused on other sections of Article IV, see generally Ryan C.
Williams, The “Guarantee” Clause, 132 HARV. L. REV. 602 (2018).
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important when divestiture is not at stake, as in the context of terminating current
or future fossil fuel leasing.
Part III also applies the text of the Clause and the “horizontal federalism”
conception of Article IV to conclude that federal preemption of state law is
mandated by the text and structure of the Constitution. The Clause grants broad
authority to Congress in the text to enact laws that are preeminent over state law
under the Supremacy Clause of Article VI. The “horizontal federalism”
conception of Article IV supports a strong role as proprietor and sovereign for
the federal government with respect to its lands. Part III then shows that while a
“horizontal federalism” conception of Article IV might support a narrow version
of the equal footing doctrine, as developed by the Supreme Court in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, it cannot support a broad version of that
doctrine that would divest the federal government of ownership of public lands
within states, nor can it support its transformation into an “equal sovereignty”
doctrine that requires Congress to provide for uniformity with respect to states
outside the context of admitting states to the Union.
Part IV examines some possible extensions of the analysis in this Article to
other questions with respect to the Property Clause. A horizontal federalism
understanding of Article IV may support broader congressional power to
structure territorial governments or federal land agencies outside the constraints
of the Appointments Clause, for instance, or broader congressional power to
structure courts and manage dispute resolution in territories or with respect to
federal lands outside the constraints of Article III.
Finally, in the Conclusion, this Article notes how a horizontal federalism
understanding of Article IV may also have traction for a range of other issues
that relate to the rest of Article IV, such as the Guarantee Clause.
I.

PROPERTY CLAUSE CONFLICTS

The federal government owns approximately 640 million acres of land
within the United States, or about thirty percent of the total land area of the
nation.24 Those lands are managed by a diverse range of agencies, from the
Department of Defense (for military bases) to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
(for national wildlife refuges); from the National Park Service to the U.S. Forest
Service and the Bureau of Land Management.25 The public lands contain some
24

CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 12.
CAROL HARDY VINCENT, LAURA A. HANSON & CARLA N. ARGUETA, FEDERAL LAND OWNERSHIP:
OVERVIEW AND DATA 1 (2017).
25
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of the most iconic landscapes and protected areas in the country; over many
decades, timber, minerals, and fossil fuels have been extracted from them; they
are used for recreation and grazing and conservation; and they include sites that
are important or even sacred for many Americans.
Those 640 million acres of public lands are in fact only a fraction of the total
amount of land that the federal government has owned since the founding of the
United States—the federal government at one point or another has owned land
that exceeds eighty percent of the total area of the country but sold or transferred
most of that land to private parties, corporations, or states over most of the
nineteenth century.26 That great land transfer helped facilitate the settlement of
much of the United States by European Americans.
Transfers happened through grants to individuals—as in the Homestead Act,
where settlers who worked 160 acres of land for five years could obtain fee
simple ownership of that land.27 There were also land grants to states upon
admission to the Union to support schools and other infrastructure objectives,
and land grants to corporations to subsidize the construction of railroads.28
Transfers also happened through sale—much of the land transfers in the first
half of the nineteenth century were through sales of land through land offices
dispersed throughout the United States.29 Transfers were often in the form of fee
simple ownership, but there were exceptions: the Stock-Raising Homestead Act
of 1916 allowed the grant of up to 640 acres of land chiefly valuable for grazing,
but the federal government retained ownership of the subsurface minerals of
granted lands.30 And the General Mining Act of 1872 authorized the granting of
a limited property interest to miners who discovered valuable minerals on the
public lands, with the interest generally being restricted to the right to extract the
minerals from those lands and the possibility of eventual fee simple ownership.31
The great extent of the public lands, their central role to the development of
the United States, and their great value—in economic and non-economic
terms—to the present and the future of the country make public lands a vital
political, legal, and policy topic. They are, for instance, at the center of the Biden
26
See CHRISTINE A. KLEIN, FEDERICO CHEEVER, BRET C. BIRDSONG, ALEXANDRA B. KLASS & ERIC
BIBER, NATURAL RESOURCES LAW: A PLACE-BASED BOOK OF PROBLEMS AND CASES 38–39 (4th ed. 2018).
27
The Homestead Act of 1862, Pub. L. No. 37-64, 12 Stat. 392.
28
See KLEIN ET AL., supra note 26, at 85.
29
See MALCOLM J. ROHRBOUGH, THE LAND OFFICE BUSINESS: THE SETTLEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION
OF AMERICAN LAND PUBLIC LANDS 1789-1837, at 233–34 (Wadsworth Publ’g Co. 1990) (1968).
30
Stock-Raising Homestead Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-290, 39 Stat. 862.
31
General Mining Act of 1872, 30 U.S.C. § 26; see also JOHN D. LESHY, THE MINING LAW: A STUDY IN
PERPETUAL MOTION 35, 39–40 (1987) (providing an overview of the law).
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administration’s efforts to address climate change through restoration of
ecosystems and landscapes and the production of renewable energy.32
The Property Clause is the most significant and relevant constitutional
provision for federal government power over the public lands. And interpreting
the Property Clause has been at the heart of a series of controversial and difficult
questions about that federal power over the public lands—whether it is
determining which branch of the federal government has primacy in managing
those lands, understanding the proper scope of federal power over those lands
vis-à-vis states, or even recognizing the basis for federal ownership of those
lands.
This Part surveys three key disputes over the Property Clause. Part I.A
provides an overview of the disputes over executive versus congressional power
in the context of the Property Clause. Part I.B describes the conflict over whether
federal law, pursuant to the Clause, preempts state law. And Part I.C introduces
the equal footing doctrine and arguments based on that doctrine that extensive
federal land ownership within states is unconstitutional.
A. Executive Versus Congressional Power
A constant question in public lands law concerns the power of the President
to interpret and administer laws enacted by Congress. This is necessarily an
inter-branch dispute because a broad executive power to interpret (or arguably,
at the extreme, disregard) congressional legislation increases executive power at
the expense of Congress. Reciprocally, constraining executive power to interpret
or implement public lands laws would empower Congress, as the President
would need to return to Congress for additional authority when faced with
ambiguity or uncertainty as to executive power.
Conflicts over the scope of executive power to interpret and administer
public land statutes extend back to the early days of the United States—for
instance, a high-stakes conflict between President Andrew Jackson and
Congress involved whether the President could unilaterally determine if the
federal government would accept only gold or silver in payment for sales of
federal lands to the public.33 In the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries,
there were prominent debates and litigation over whether presidents had the

32
See Exec. Order No. 14,008, 86 Fed. Reg. 7,619 (Jan. 27, 2021) (aiming at “[t]ackling the [c]limate
[c]risis at [h]ome and [a]broad”).
33
See infra notes 160–66 and accompanying text.
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power to protect public lands from privatization by withdrawing them from
disposal statutes.34
Today, these debates focus on the extent to which public lands should be
protected from large-scale industrial development, such as mining or oil and gas
extraction. Since the early twentieth century, presidents have had the power to
designate national monuments pursuant to the Antiquities Act. Under the Act,
the President is authorized to do the following:
[T]he President of the United States is hereby authorized, in his
discretion, to declare by public proclamation historic landmarks,
historic and prehistoric structures, and other objects of historic or
scientific interest that are situated upon the lands owned or controlled
by the Government of the United States to be national monuments, and
may reserve as a part thereof parcels of land, the limits of which in all
cases shall be confined to the smallest area compatible with the proper
care and management of the objects to be protected.35

Since President Theodore Roosevelt, during whose administration the Act was
passed, many presidents have used the Antiquities Act to set aside large areas of
land from development. President Theodore Roosevelt protected the Grand
Canyon; President Franklin Roosevelt protected areas adjoining Grand Teton
National Park; President Carter protected large swaths of Alaska; President
Clinton protected red rock deserts in southwestern Utah; and President Obama
protected additional areas of Utah, including the Bears Ears National
Monument, proclaimed in late 2016.36
The current controversy entails efforts by the Trump administration to
unilaterally eliminate or substantially shrink national monument designations by
past administrations—most significantly, those of the Bears Ears National
Monument in Utah by the Obama administration and the Grand StaircaseEscalante National Monument in Utah by the Clinton administration.37 The
language of the Antiquities Act does not explicitly empower the President to
undo designations of monuments. While there are past examples of executive
changes to previously designated monuments, only one approaches the scope of
the Trump administration’s changes, and none of the previous changes were
34

See infra Part III.A.
Antiquities Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-209, 34 Stat. 225.
36
See KLEIN ET AL., supra note 26, at 584–88.
37
See John C. Ruple, The Trump Administration and Lessons Not Learned from Prior National
Monument Modifications, 43 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 1, 3 (2019); Mark Squillace, Eric Biber, Nicholas S. Bryner
& Sean B. Hecht, Presidents Lack the Authority to Abolish or Diminish National Monuments, 103 VA. L. REV.
ONLINE 55, 55 n.2 (2017).
35
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challenged in court.38 Scholarly defenders of the Trump administration argued
that the ability to undo the actions of past presidents is an inherent component
of executive power and should be read into the statutes even if not explicitly
granted to the President in the text of the statute—these defenders accordingly
developed a broad narrative of executive power in the context of public lands.39
Critics took a narrower vision of presidential power, emphasizing the textual
grant of power to Congress under the Property Clause.40
The positions, however, will likely be reversed under the Biden
administration when it comes to the development of federal public lands for
fossil fuel extraction. Pursuant to statute, the Executive Branch can lease areas
of federal public lands for coal, oil, and gas production—to date over thirteen
million acres are leased, producing a substantial fraction of the total fossil fuel
production in the United States.41 Fossil fuel production from federal public
lands is significant from a climate change perspective, ultimately contributing
about one-quarter of all greenhouse gas emissions in the country.42
As with the Antiquities Act, the Executive Branch is given broad discretion
about whether and which lands to lease for fossil fuel development. There are
provisions that allow for the termination of leases for violation of lease terms
and other causes—in addition, like the Antiquities Act, the statute neither
explicitly authorizes nor prohibits unilateral executive termination of existing
leases without cause.43
Environmental advocates have long urged the United States to cease leasing
new areas for fossil fuel leasing, contending that the Executive’s broad
discretion to decide whether and which lands to lease enables a president to also
refuse to lease any lands.44 These advocates contend this step is necessary
because of the need both to protect public lands from the localized negative
impacts of development and to restrict greenhouse gas emissions that contribute
38
See Ruple, supra note 37, at 3–4. Several of these reductions involved military operations or the need
for resources for military operations during war, and therefore might be understood as based on presidential war
powers. Jedediah Britton-Purdy, Whose Lands? Which Public? The Shape of Public-Lands Law and Trump’s
National Monument Proclamations, 45 ECOLOGY L.Q. 921, 939 n.76, 953 (2018).
39
See Yoo & Gaziano, supra note 21, at 639–40.
40
See, e.g., Squillace et al., supra note 37, at 56.
41
See BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., LAND STATISTICS 2019, at 84–85 tbl.3-12, 86–93 tbl.3-13 (2020)
(providing statistics for oil and gas leases); Eric Biber & Jordan Diamond, Keeping it All in the Ground?, 63
ARIZ. L. REV. 279, 282 (2021) (noting federal leases produce twenty-four percent of oil production, thirteen
percent of natural gas, and forty-three percent of coal in the United States).
42
See Biber & Diamond, supra note 41.
43
Id.
44
Id. at 280.
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to climate change.45 Opponents contend that the language and the purpose of the
statute mandate the development of federal lands for fossil fuels and a minimum
level of leasing and development.46 One can go even further, however, in
restricting fossil fuel development on federal lands by terminating existing
leases on a piecemeal or wholesale basis.47
Debates over executive power under the Property Clause come and go in
significant part because of the importance of statutes granting broad discretion
to the Executive under the Clause. For instance, the Mineral Leasing Act, which
sets up the system for leasing federal lands for oil and gas development,
authorizes the Secretary of the Interior “to do any and all things necessary to
carry out and accomplish the purposes of this chapter.”48 Likewise, the language
of the Antiquities Act allows broad discretion as to what kinds of resources
qualify lands for designation as national monuments—so broad that courts have
mostly refused to second-guess presidential proclamations of monuments.49
Accordingly, these debates over executive power will recur and persist beyond
the current debates over national monuments and fossil fuel leasing. And the
application of congressional statutes to millions of acres of land and thousands
of individual management actions also necessarily means that the Executive has
discretion to interpret and apply even relatively clear and specific laws.
B. Preemption
Another key constitutional debate over the Property Clause has been the
extent to which legislative powers exercised by Congress pursuant to the Clause
preempt state law. The Supreme Court definitively stated in 1976 that

45

Id.
See Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 493 F. Supp. 3d 1046, 1062, 1086 (D. Wyo. 2020) (holding
that regulations restricting methane emissions from oil and gas exceeded the scope of agency authority in part
because it exceeded the power of the Bureau of Land Management under the Mineral Leasing Act (MLA), which
is “to promote the orderly development of oil and gas deposits” (quoting Geosearch, Inc. v. Andrus, 508 F. Supp.
839, 842 (D. Wyo. 1981))); see also Harvey v. Udall, 384 F.2d 883, 885 (10th Cir. 1967) (stating that the purpose
of the MLA, which structures leasing of federal lands for oil and gas development, is “to promote the orderly
development of the oil and gas deposits in the publicly owned lands of the United States through private
enterprise” (citation omitted)); Conway v. Watt, 717 F.2d 512, 514 (10th Cir. 1983) (“The purpose behind [the
MLA] was . . . [the] development of the nation as a whole.”); Cal. Co. v. Udall, 296 F.2d 384, 388 (D.C. Cir.
1961) (“The Act was intended to promote wise development of these natural resources and to obtain for the
public a reasonable financial return on assets that ‘belong’ to the public.”).
47
See Biber & Diamond, supra note 41, at 283.
48
Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, 30 U.S.C. § 189.
49
See, e.g., Wyoming v. Franke, 58 F. Supp. 890, 892 (D. Wyo. 1945) (dismissing request to void
presidential proclamation). A recent opinion by Chief Justice Roberts questioned broad presidential authority to
designate national monuments. See infra note 162.
46
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congressional acts under the Clause have preemptive authority.50 Such an
argument has a strong grounding in the text of the Constitution, as acts of
Congress are “Laws” pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of Article VI.51
Nonetheless, a range of commentators continues to argue against preemption
or for significantly limited preemption pursuant to the Clause.52 These
arguments often draw on claims that Property Clause powers are “proprietary”
in nature, and therefore do not warrant full preemptive powers.53 Alternatively,
they draw on arguments that the text of the Clause grants Congress only the
power either to “dispose” of its lands or to enact “needful” rules and regulations
that implement other congressional powers under the Constitution, such that
there is not a standalone congressional power under the Clause that can support
preemption.54 Most recently, one scholar has drawn on the history of
congressional debates over the Clause to oppose preemption.55
C. Divestiture of Federal Lands Under the Equal Footing Doctrine
The most fundamental constitutional debate over the Property Clause is the
extent to which the federal government should even have ownership and control
over lands within the borders of states. The argument, in its most basic form, is
that once a state is admitted to the Union, it must enter on equal footing with
existing states. That in return requires the federal government to transfer
ownership of its remaining lands within newly admitted states—either to private
entities or to the state—to ensure that the newly admitted state enters on equal
footing.56 In particular, equality is required with the original thirteen states, none
of which would have originally had federal lands within their borders, except for
limited pieces of property needed for federal buildings, military bases, and
similar facilities.57
The argument has been in the political and legal discourse since the 1830s.
Dicta in a Supreme Court case from the 1840s, Pollard v. Hagan, supports the
claim.58 That opinion became the basis for the equal footing doctrine, which the
50
Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 543 (1976); see also Cal. Coastal Comm’n v. Granite Rock Co.,
480 U.S. 572, 580–81 (1987) (applying preemption under the Clause).
51
Appel, supra note 21, at 10.
52
See, e.g., Engdahl, supra note 21, at 304; Schmitt, Limiting the Property Clause, supra note 21, at 148.
53
See, e.g., Engdahl, supra note 21, at 304, 308–10.
54
Natelson, supra note 21, at 350, 363–65; Brodie, supra note 21, at 710–11.
55
Schmitt, Limiting the Property Clause, supra note 21, at 154–55.
56
Louis Touton, The Property Power, Federalism, and the Equal Footing Doctrine, 80 COLUM. L. REV.
817, 833 (1980).
57
Id.
58
44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 216 (1845).
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Supreme Court has adopted and applied to a range of contexts.59 But the
Supreme Court has never applied the equal footing doctrine to question federal
land ownership within states since Pollard, and federal courts have repeatedly
and uniformly upheld federal land ownership against equal footing challenges.60
That lack of legal success has not stopped the doctrine from being adopted
by a range of political actors on a regular basis. In the 1950s, 1970s, 1990s, and
2010s, there were calls for divestment of some or all federal public domain to
states, local governments, or private entities—calls that were on occasion
associated with violence against federal land managers.61 In the late 2010s, Utah
even appropriated millions of dollars to support a lawsuit challenging federal
ownership of lands within the state.62
The Supreme Court has most frequently applied the equal footing doctrine
in two contexts. First, the Court has held that ownership of lands submerged
beneath navigable waters at the time a state is admitted to the Union transfers
automatically to the newly admitted state.63 Second, the Court has drawn on the
doctrine in interpreting and understanding the scope of the laws admitting states
to the Union. In particular, the Court has relied on the doctrine to strike down or
narrowly interpret a range of provisions in admissions statutes that imposed
conditions on states as part of their admission. For instance, the Court struck
down a condition in Oklahoma’s admission act that required it to keep its state
capital in a specific city for a period of time.64 The Court argued that Congress
could not use its power to admit states under Article IV, Section 3 to impose
fundamental political inequality on a state relative to other states.65 A state’s
choice of the location of its state capital, the Court held, was a core example of
political sovereignty that Congress could not diminish.66

59

See, e.g., Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 575–77 (1911).
See Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 597–98 (1963); Scott v. Lattig, 227 U.S. 229, 244 (1913);
Texas v. Louisiana, 410 U.S. 702, 713 (1973); United States v. Gardner, 107 F.3d 1314, 1317–18 (9th Cir. 1997);
see also infra note 202 and accompanying text (noting that the case law has not been applied to terrestrial land
ownership).
61
See supra notes 8–9 and accompanying text.
62
See Hummel, supra note 8; Nick Lawton, Utah’s Transfer of Public Lands Act: Demanding a Gift of
Federal Lands, 16 VT. J. ENV’T L. 1, 16 (2014).
63
See Pollard, 44 U.S. at 229.
64
Coyle, 221 U.S. at 574.
65
Id.
66
Coyle, 221 U.S. at 565 (“The power to locate its own seat of government, and to determine when and
how it shall be changed from one place to another, and to appropriate its own public funds for that purpose, are
essentially and peculiarly state powers.”).
60
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In the 2010s, the Court significantly extended this equal footing doctrine by
identifying an “equal sovereignty” doctrine that may limit Congress’s ability to
impose unequal burdens on existing states outside the context of admitting
states.67 The Court relied on this principle to strike down a provision of the
Voting Rights Act that required specific states to have changes in their voting
rules pre-cleared by the federal government.68
***
All three of these sets of arguments—about (1) executive power under the
Clause, (2) the preemptive power of federal law under the Clause, and (3) the
federal government’s power to retain ownership of lands within admitted
states—depend on a proper understanding of the role that the Clause plays in the
Constitution’s overall structure. Understanding that role in turn requires placing
the Property Clause within historical context and within the broader structure of
Article IV.
II. UNDERSTANDING THE PROPERTY CLAUSE IN CONTEXT
The Property Clause explicitly grants Congress the “Power to dispose of and
make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other
Property belonging to the United States.”69 A simple textualist argument would
assert that this gives Congress primacy in determining how to manage federal
lands, and it would argue against broad executive power in interpreting and
applying relevant statutes. Likewise, congressional actions pursuant to the
Clause are “laws” that qualify for preemptive power over the states under the
Supremacy Clause of Article VI. Any arguments against preemptive power or
for executive power, therefore, must be structural or based on history or a claim
about the purpose of the Clause. However, as this Part shows, any structural or
historical arguments generally cut against state supremacy or strong executive
power in the Property Clause context. There is one important exception,
developed at the end of this Part—the structural necessity for some residual
executive power to fill in gaps in congressional statutes where relevant for
pressing decisions to protect or manage the public lands. As for historical

67

Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 535 (2013).
Id. at 544.
69
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3. The Property Clause has been the basis for congressional power over both
federal territories and federal lands within admitted states. The focus of this Article is on the application of the
Clause in the public lands context; but, where relevant, I will draw on the territorial context. Part IV notes how
the analysis developed in this Article might have relevance in the territorial context as well.
68
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practice, Part III develops that in more detail, exploring the application of the
principles developed in this Part to the specific problems introduced in Part I.
Part II.A begins with an overview of the historical context, examining how
the Clause was a key component of resolving disputes among the original
thirteen states as to claims in the West of the new nation. This context clarifies
how the Property Clause is closely tied to interstate relations and horizontal
federalism, and thus can inform two types of arguments: (1) congressional power
arguments under the Clause to preempt state law, and (2) equal footing
arguments about the constitutionality of federal land ownership. Part II.B
explains how an understanding of Article IV as a coherent component of the
Constitution that advances horizontal federalism—rather than a grab-bag of
miscellaneous provisions—provides structural arguments for congressional
primacy in administering the Clause. Finally, Part II.C describes how, despite
congressional primacy, there is also an inherent need for some level of executive
discretion in the day-to-day management of public lands.
A. The Resolution of State Western Land Claim Disputes
The Property Clause’s location in Section 3 means that it is co-located with
the Admissions Clause, the source of the federal government’s power to create
new states.70 That co-location is not accidental—indeed, it is central to
understanding the historical context of the Property Clause. The Property Clause
was added to the Constitution as part of an overall resolution of disputes between
the original thirteen states over claims to lands west of the Appalachians—
disputes that were at the center of the politics of the Articles of Confederation
and the drafting of the Constitution. That historical context is important because
it explains the connection between the Property Clause and a broader
understanding of Article IV as oriented towards horizontal federalism.
After the American Revolution, the newly independent states were faced
with overlapping and conflicting claims to western lands, without the possibility
of arbitration by the British government.71 Several states had no western land
70

Id.
See PETER S. ONUF, THE ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC: JURISDICTIONAL CONTROVERSIES IN THE
UNITED STATES 1775–1787, at 8–9, 45–51 (1983) [hereinafter ONUF, ORIGINS]; DAVID C. HENDRICKSON, PEACE
PACT: THE LOST WORLD OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDING 10, 120–21 (2003); Metzger, supra note 23, at 1497–98;
THE FEDERALIST NO. 7, at 60–61 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (noting risks of conflicts
over western land claims); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 142 (1810) (Marshall, C.J.) (stating that resolution of
western land claims “was a momentous question which . . . threatened to shake the American confederacy to its
foundation. This important and dangerous contest has been compromised, and the compromise is not now to be
71
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claims and strongly argued that those western land claims should benefit all
states, since all states had fought for independence from the British.72 Maryland
felt so strongly about the importance of western land claims that it refused to
ratify the Articles of Confederation for several years because the Articles did not
address the issue.73 In part, because of these disputes, New York and Virginia
both offered to cede their claims to the Confederation Congress in return for
specific conditions—most importantly, that the western lands would be set up
as new states once settled by European-Americans.74 This condition was based
on a concern that otherwise western lands might permanently be held in a
position of political subordination or that they would be part of large, unwieldy
states that would be ungovernable as republics and vulnerable to secessionist
movements in the West.75 Accordingly, the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which
was the compromise reached by the Confederation Congress to facilitate the
transfer of the ceded land claims by Virginia and other states to the United
States, provided for the admission of new states when population thresholds had
been met.76

disturbed”); JOSEPH STORY, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 214–16 (1833)
(noting the importance of these conflicts); Peter S. Onuf, Territories and Statehood, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
AMERICAN POLITICAL HISTORY 1283, 1286 (Jack P. Greene ed., 1984) [hereinafter Onuf, Territories and
Statehood] (stating western land claims were “critical to the very survival of the states” and “a chronic source
of conflict among the United States and thus jeopardized cooperation in the war effort”); Edwards v. Carter, 580
F.2d 1055, 1059 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (per curiam); JOHN D. LESHY, OUR COMMON GROUND: A HISTORY OF
AMERICA’S PUBLIC LANDS (forthcoming 2022). Conflict over these western land claims was significant enough
to prevent adoption of a proposed provision in the Articles that would have provided a guarantee by the United
States of state borders precisely because those borders were contested between the states. Williams, supra note
23, at 636–37.
72
See HENDRICKSON, supra note 71, at 135, 138–41; LESHY, supra note 71, at 6–7; Luther Martin,
Genuine Information XI, BALT. MD. GAZETTE, Feb. 5, 1788, reprinted in 16 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 39, 39–42 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1986).
73
See HENDRICKSON, supra note 71, at 148, 150; STORY, supra note 71, at 215. Other landless states also
delayed their ratification of the Articles on similar grounds. See Williams, supra note 23, at 639; ONUF, ORIGINS,
supra note 71, at 13 (“Ratification of the Articles without prior boundary negotiations would fix the existing
unequal distribution of territory among the states. ‘It would not be safe’ for the small states to confirm the large,
landed states (particularly Virginia) in their extensive charter claims, said Samuel Chase of Maryland.”).
74
See ONUF, ORIGINS, supra note 71, at 14–17; Williams, supra note 23, at 639–40.
75
Eric Biber, The Price of Admission: Causes, Effects, and Patterns of Conditions Imposed on States
Entering the Union, 46 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 119, 132–35 (2004).
76
An Ordinance for the Government of the Territory of the United States North West of the River Ohio,
in 32 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 334, 342 (Roscoe R. Hill ed., 1936) (1787);
PETER S. ONUF, STATEHOOD AND UNION, at xviii–xxi (1987). Congress did not consider itself bound by this
provision in future admission decisions and did not, in fact, automatically grant admission once the population
threshold had been met. See Biber, supra note 75, at 126 n.19, 127.
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Thus, the establishment of new states was a key component of the resolution
of land claim disputes.77 In addition, states without western land claims (socalled “landless” states) and small states generally feared that without splitting
off the western land claims of the large states, the small states would eventually
be dominated by the large states.78 Some small state delegates argued in the
Convention and in ratification that Congress should have the power to
unilaterally split states into smaller units to provide greater equity.79 Those
arguments failed80—the Admission Clause has explicit language requiring the
consent of a state for its division81—but they show how the admission of new
states was intimately connected with the interrelationship of the existing states.82
77
See Williams, supra note 23, at 628 (noting that the Admissions and Property Clauses “addressed one
of the most significant sources of rivalry between the states at the time of the Constitution’s formation—namely,
rivalrous claims to sovereignty over western lands”).
78
See ONUF, ORIGINS, supra note 71, at 3–4, 151; Onuf, Territories and Statehood, supra note 71, at
1286 (noting the “imbalance” between landed and landless states “was a continuing source of friction, subverting
the equality of the states, the fundamental principle of union on which the Articles of Confederation were
grounded”). Ryan C. Williams noted the following:

The landless states, wary of entering into a political union with states whose boundaries would
dwarf their own, insisted that title and jurisdiction to the western lands should be held in collective
trust by the Confederation government and used as a public fund to repay debts incurred during
the Revolution. The landed states insisted on the validity of their extensive territorial claims.
Williams, supra note 23, at 636–37.
79
See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 461–62 (Max Farrand ed., 1911)
[hereinafter 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS] (presenting how Carrol, a Maryland delegate, sought to eliminate language
that required the consent of a state for its division, partly on concerns about landed states monopolizing the
western lands); id. at 463–64 (presenting similar objections to another Maryland delegate, Luther Martin, who
“urged the unreasonableness of forcing & guaranteeing the people of Virginia beyond the Mountains, the
Western people, of N. Carolina. [sic] & of Georgia, & the people of Maine, to continue under the States now
governing them, without the consent of those States to their separation” and threatened that the small landless
states might leave the Convention if consent by states for splitting was required); Luther Martin, The Genuine
Information, Speech to Legislature of Maryland in Opposition to the Constitution (Nov. 29, 1787), reprinted in
3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 172, 224–27 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter 3
FARRAND’S RECORDS].
80
See 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 79, at 464.
81
See Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, Is West Virginia Unconstitutional?, 90 CALIF. L. REV.
291, 332–95 (2002) (conducting a thorough analysis of the history and text of the provision).
82
Roger M. Sullivan, Jr., The Power of Congress Under the Property Clause: A Potential Check on the
Effect of the Chadha Decision on Public Land Legislation, 6 PUB. LAND L. REV. 65, 82 (1985) (explaining the
jealousy over new western states potentially dominating existing states and how “this concern ultimately had a
direct impact on the new states clause as well as a significant, though more subtle, impact on the property
clause”). The contemporary importance of the consent requirement for merger and splitting of existing states is
shown by the fact that those provisions received some of the greatest attention of the provisions in Article IV in
the Convention and ratification debates. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 273–74 (James Madison) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961) (noting the importance of providing for the admission of new states but focusing primarily
on protections against creating new states from existing ones or merging states). The Clause received particular
attention in ratification debates in Virginia and Massachusetts because of the possibility of splitting off Kentucky
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Granting Congress the power to admit new states also raised the question of
whether new states would be put on an equal footing with the existing states.
There was sharp division over this in the Convention. Some delegates expressed
concerns that western states would eventually dominate the eastern states, and
accordingly proposed that any new western states should be granted subordinate
status relative to the eastern states.83 Many other delegates argued for equal
treatment of new states, both on the grounds that such equality was normatively
desirable and that otherwise westerners might secede or ally with foreign
powers.84 Explicit language requiring admission of new states on an “equal
footing” was rejected by the Convention, leaving broad plenary power in
Congress.85
This history of the Admissions Clause as an effort to resolve interstate
disputes over the western land claims directly connects to the Property Clause.
While a key component of resolving the disputes over western land claims
required the transfer of those claims from states to the United States, the Articles
of Confederation provided no method for managing the lands ceded to the
United States.86 The Property Clause was developed to facilitate the solution to
and Maine, respectively, as separate states. See, e.g., Pa. Herald, 9 February, as reprinted in RATIFICATION BY
THE STATES: MASSACHUSETTS 884–85, in 5 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 1998) (reporting on the importance of this provision for Maine
delegates to the Massachusetts constitutional convention); Letter from John Brown (June 7, 1788), reprinted in
11 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 88, 89 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1977) (reporting on the importance for
Kentucky to be able to form a separate state).
83
See, e.g., 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 533–34 (Max Farrand ed., 1911)
[hereinafter 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS] (recording Governour Morris, a Convention delegate from New York,
proposing to fix representation in the House of Representatives to ensure that existing states always had more
votes than any new states); id. at 559–60 (recording Gorham proposing that western state representation be
adjusted to ensure eastern states retain control); 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 79, at 2–3 (recording Gerry
making a similar proposal); 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra, at 541 (recording King’s concern that western states
with small populations will get disproportionate representation in Congress).
84
See, e.g., 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 83, at 578–79 (depicting George Mason supporting equal
representation for western states); id. at 584–85 (depicting Madison taking the same position); JACK N. RAKOVE,
ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 72–73 (1996);
HENDRICKSON, supra note 71, at 239–40. The debate over new state equality had a sectional valence, as the
expectation at the time of the Convention and ratification debates was that most new states would be southern
in orientation; southern delegates accordingly supported equality of new states and broad powers to admit new
states in Congress. HENDRICKSON, supra note 71, at 227–28, 237.
85
See 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 79, at 454, 457–58, 464 (showing equal footing language was
dropped on the motion of Morris, with no explanation as to why); see also Metzger, supra note 23, at 1499
(noting that the equal footing language was intentionally omitted at the Convention).
86
The Articles also did not provide a generic provision authorizing Congress to admit new states but
instead only included specific language that addressed how Canada might join the Union. This left open the
question of whether Congress could admit other new states under the Articles or manage the lands ceded to the
United States. See THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 270 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). See generally
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interstate conflict: by providing a constitutional basis for governance of the
public lands, it transferred the source of interstate conflict (the western lands) to
the United States, which would manage it on behalf of all the states.87 The
connection of the provision to the interstate conflict over land claims is made
clear by the inclusion of a disclaimer in the second part of the Property Clause
that the Constitution did not “Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or of
any particular State.”88
This historical context shows that giving Congress the power to manage the
federal public lands was a central part of resolving a dispute among the states as
to who should control the western lands. Granting the federal legislature—
Congress—power in the Property Clause advanced the growth and development
of the federal government and thus, in part, advanced vertical federalism.
However, the Clause was also crucial in advancing inter-state relationships by
resolving inter-state disputes over western land claims, and thus advanced
horizontal federalism as well.
B. A Horizontal Federalism Model for Article IV
Complementing this historical context for the Property Clause is the location
of the Clause in Article IV. That location gives weight to the historical context,
helping explain how the Clause fits within the Article and the Constitution as a
whole. The Article’s focus on state-to-state relationships—horizontal
federalism—supports an understanding of general primacy of congressional
power in the context of the provisions of Article IV.
LESHY, supra note 71, at 14–27 (explaining the shortcomings of the Articles in its dealing with western lands
and how the constitutional convention delt with the issue through the Property Clause). The drafters of the
Articles had left out language giving the United States authority over western lands because of the controversy
between landless and landed states. HENDRICKSON, supra note 71, at 132–33, 146. The framers of the
Constitution were aware of and sought to rectify this lack of authority for the United States under the Articles.
1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 83, at 28 (depicting Governor Randolph noting the need to provide for
admission of new states in the Constitution); PAUL W. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT
73 (1968) (“The problems posed by the existence of the western lands, the formation of new states, and the
questionable legality of acts of the Congress of the Confederation concerning the public lands were of utmost
importance to many of the delegates of the Constitutional Convention.”); Sullivan, supra note 82, at 79–80.
87
Glicksman, supra note 22, at 59–60 n.360 (noting the Property Clause’s location “in article IV probably
reflects the Framers’ focus in enacting article IV, section 3 on the admission of new states to the union and on
the resolution of the conflicting claims of the federal and state governments to the territories,” which explains
why the Clause was “placed in article IV, which deals with relations among the states and between the states
and the federal government, rather than in article I, which deals with legislative powers” (citations omitted)).
Alexander Hamilton noted the risk of conflicting western claims for the stability of the Union and thus the need
for federal control. THE FEDERALIST NO. 7, at 60–61 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see
also KLEIN ET AL., supra note 26, at 41 (noting this connection).
88
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
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On its face, Article IV is primarily concerned with state-to-state relations.
The first Section requires states to give “Full Faith and Credit” to the “public
Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other state.”89 The first Clause
of the second Section requires that citizens of a state “shall be entitled to all
Privileges and Immunities of the Citizens in the several States.”90 The second
Section also requires states to extradite to other states’ fugitives from justice and
to return fugitive slaves.91 The third Section allows Congress to admit new
states, creates a process for the merging or division of existing states, and
authorizes Congress to “dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations
respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States.”92 The
fourth Section provides that “[t]he United States shall guarantee to every State
in this Union a Republican Form of Government” and will protect states against
invasion and “domestic Violence.”93
The various provisions in the Article were combined into a single article by
the Committee on Style at the end of the Constitutional Convention.94 The
Supreme Court has stated that the Committee on Style’s edits to the
constitutional text should not be given great weight in interpreting the meaning
of the Constitution because the Committee was not authorized to make
substantive changes to the text.95 But even earlier drafts of the Constitution
separated out the provisions of what is now Article IV into a series of Articles
located together at the end of the Constitution.96 The notes from the Committee
of Detail as to the initial draft of the entire Constitution presented to the full
Convention described the structure as “treat[ing] of the legislative, judiciary and
executive in their order, and afterwards, of the miscellaneous subjects, as they
occur, bringing together all the resolutions, belonging to the same point,
howsoever they may be scattered about and leaving to the last the steps
necessary to introduce the government.”97 Those miscellaneous provisions
included the Admission Clause and the Guarantee Clause.98 This drafting history

89

Id. § 1.
Id. § 2, cl. 1.
91
Id. § 2, cls. 2–3. The third Clause was effectively repealed by the adoption of the Thirteenth
Amendment abolishing slavery. Id. amend XIII, § 1.
92
Id. art. IV, § 3.
93
Id. § 4.
94
2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 79, at 601–02.
95
See, e.g., U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 792 n.8 (1995) (noting the Committee on
Style was appointed to merely arrange the agreed upon articles).
96
2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 79, at 187–88.
97
Id. at 138 (emphasis omitted).
98
Id. at 147–48.
90
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lends additional support to an interpretation that focuses on the separate identity
of Article IV.
In contrast to the first three articles of the Constitution, Article IV only has
limited provisions with respect to the powers of the federal government:
Congress is authorized to implement Section 1 on full faith and credit;99 under
Section 3, Congress can admit new states and manage the property and territories
of the United States,100 and the United States will guarantee the republican
nature of the states.101 Indeed, the Article has no mention whatsoever of the other
two of the three branches of the federal government: the President or the
Judiciary.
Article IV thus stands out from the rest of the Constitution, particularly the
first three articles, in its focus on state-to-state relations rather than on the powers
and limits of the federal government. Courts and commentators have noted these
unique features of Article IV, identifying Article IV as a “states” Article of the
Constitution focused on comity between the states.102 Friendly state-to-state
relationships are of obvious importance in any sustained political relationship
between those states, whether that political relationship is more confederal (as
under the Articles of Confederation) or federal. So, it is perhaps not surprising
that many of the provisions in Article IV are very similar to provisions of the
Articles of Confederation, in that the relationships between states was the
component of the Articles that was least different from the Constitution.103 In
99

U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
Id. § 3.
101
Id. § 4.
102
See, e.g., Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 661 (1975) (calling Article IV the “comity article”);
Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm’n of Mont., 436 U.S. 371, 379 (1978) (calling Article IV the “so-called States’
Relations Article”); Brainerd Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and the
Judicial Function, 26 U. CHI. L. REV. 9, 14 (1958) (stating that Article IV relates to “the comity of nations” and
“interstate conflicts”); Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws,
104 YALE L.J. 541, 566 (1994) (calling Article IV the “states” article).
103
Both the Full Faith and Credit provision and the Privileges and Immunities provision borrowed heavily
from the Articles. Compare U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (the Constitution’s Full Faith and Credit provision), with
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IV, para. 3 (the Articles of Confederation’s Full Faith and Credit
provision); compare U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 (the Constitution’s Privileges and Immunities provision),
with ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IV, para. 1 (the Articles of Confederation’s Privileges and
Immunities provision). For discussion on the ratification debates, see generally CHARLES PINCKNEY,
OBSERVATIONS ON THE PLAN OF GOVERNMENT SUBMITTED TO THE FEDERAL CONVENTION (1787) (Pinckney, a
delegate from South Carolina, noting how many Article IV provisions were based on the Articles). For courts
and commentators noting the similarities between the Full Faith and Credit provisions of the Constitution and
Articles of Confederation, see Kurt H. Nadelmann, Full Faith and Credit to Judgments and Public Acts: A
Historical-Analytical Reappraisal, 56 MICH. L. REV. 33, 54 (1957); Charles M. Yablon, Madison’s Full Faith
and Credit: A Historical Analysis, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 125, 144 (2011); Daniel A. Crane, The Original
100
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contrast, the Constitution structured the federal government of the United States
in a way very different from the Articles—in fact, one of the key purposes of
developing the Constitution was to replace the state-to-state treaty system of the
Articles, in which the Union had to act through the individual states, with a
system in which the federal government could operate independently of the
states with respect to revenue and regulation.104
The distinction between the material in Articles I, II, III, and IV of the
Constitution can be understood as the distinction between vertical and horizontal
federalism, with Articles I through III focused on creating the institutional
infrastructure necessary for vertical federalism—the federal government—while
Article IV focused on creating the institutional infrastructure of horizontal
federalism—relationships between the states.105 Given this focus on horizontal
federalism, a number of scholars have drawn connections between Article IV
and international law, with Article IV serving more as a guide to ensuring

Understanding of the “Effects Clause” of Article IV, Section 1 and Implications for the Defense of Marriage
Act, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 307, 330–31 (1998). Some courts and commentators also note the similarities
between the Privileges and Immunities provisions. See Austin, 420 U.S. at 661 n.6; United States v. Harris, 106
U.S. 629, 643–44 (1883); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 359
(1998); David S. Bogen, The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, 37 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 794,
795 (1987); Chester James Antieau, Paul’s Perverted Privileges or the True Meaning of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article Four, 9 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 3 (1967). The similarities are likely one reason
Article IV was not a focus of discussion at the Convention or in the ratification debates. See Bogen, supra, at
840; Crane, supra, at 330–31.
104
See JOSEPH J. ELLIS, THE QUARTET: ORCHESTRATING THE SECOND AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 17831789, at 123–26 (2015) (explaining Madison’s successful “shift in sovereignty from the state to the national
level”).
105
See, e.g., John M. Gonzales, The Interstate Privileges and Immunities: Fundamental Rights and
Federalism?, 15 CAP. U. L. REV. 493, 499–500 (1986) (“All of article IV, except perhaps for section 3, clause
2, prohibits in one way or another state imposed obstacles to effective federalism.”); Thomas H. Lee, Making
Sense of the Eleventh Amendment: International Law and State Sovereignty, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1027, 1051
(2002) (distinguishing between the constitutional provisions that “invested the three branches of general
government with national powers intended to create a strong, wealthy, and unified polity where the States were
conceived of as constituent parts of one nation” and the provisions of Article IV, which were “designed to
increase cooperation and to decrease conflict among the States without denigrating their individual internal
sovereignties”); Williams, supra note 23, at 626–27 (“Articles I, II, and III define the composition and the powers
of the three departments of the federal government—legislative, executive, and judicial, respectively. . . .
Article IV . . . . takes as its central focus the ‘horizontal’ relationships between states within the federal Union.”);
Stephen E. Sachs & Steve Sanders, Interactive Constitution: Article IV, Section 1: Full Faith and Credit Clause,
NAT’L CONST. CTR., https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/interpretation/article-iv/clauses/44
(last visited Feb. 2, 2022) (“Most of the original Constitution focuses on creating the federal government,
defining its relationship to the states and the people at large. Article IV addresses something different: the states’
relations with each other, sometimes called ‘horizontal federalism.’”).
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harmonious relationships between sovereigns than in the creation of an
overarching government.106
Horizontal federalism—establishing harmonious and friendly relationships
directly between the states, as opposed to through the mediating structures of the
federal government—was seen by the framers of the Constitution as a central
component of building a cohesive Union. The framers identified the conflicts
between states, as well as differential treatment by states of other states’ citizens,
as a crucial flaw under the Articles of Confederation and a real threat to the
integrity of the Union.107
What are the implications of a horizontal federalism understanding of Article
IV as a whole for interpretation of the meaning of the Property Clause? A key
one is that the focus on horizontal federalism in Article IV implies a primary
role for Congress, rather than the President, in the implementation of Article IV.
After all, the text of Article IV nowhere mentions the President, but grants any
implementation power for the federal government to Congress or the United
States as a whole.
But there are other bases for a primary role for Congress in the
implementation of Article IV. Congress was understood by the framers as the
representative of the states—indeed, the most important debates in the
Constitutional Convention were whether states would be represented in
Congress equally or by population. The result was a compromise in which
representation would be equal in one chamber (the Senate) and by population in
the other (the House of Representatives). Allocation of seats by state population
in the House means that states are not equally represented in Congress, but
representation is not purely population based. States that have a population
below the minimum for one Representative still receive representation, and that

106
See Williams, supra note 23, at 626–27; Lee, supra note 105, at 1051–52; Douglas Laycock, Equal
Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV.
249, 259–60 (1992).
107
See, e.g., HENDRICKSON, supra note 71, at 214 (noting multiple “trespasses of the states on the rights
of each other” under the Articles of Confederation, including restrictions on trade and commerce, use of paper
money, and debts and contracts, and that these restrictions could beget “retaliations[] . . . ‘adverse to the spirit
of the Union’ and ‘destructive of the general harmony’”); STORY, supra note 71, at 185 (referring to the conflicts
among states over commerce and trade under the Articles of Confederation by explaining “[t]he difference of
regulations was a perpetual source of irritation and jealousy. Real or imaginary grievances were multiplied in
every direction; and thus State animosities and local prejudices were fostered to a high degree, so as to threaten
at once the peace and safety of the Union”).
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has been reflected in the actual distribution of Representatives throughout much
of the history of Congress.108
In contrast, the President is the sole federal official elected on a national
basis. This point is regularly and repeatedly relied upon in modern constitutional
and administrative law, often as a justification for primacy of the President in
supervision of the federal bureaucracy.109 It is true (as with the House of
Representatives) that the President’s election is mediated at the state level by
electors through the Electoral College. The difference between the President, a
Representative, and a Senator is that, of course, only the President is chosen by
all states as an individual, while the Senate and the House are collectivities
representing members from individual states. It is also true that the national
nature of the election of the President did not receive a large amount of attention
in the framing and ratification of the Constitution110—perhaps because it was
obvious that the Executive (whether plural or singular, whether elected by the
Congress or by the people or electors) would necessarily be in charge of the
entire national government. In the Constitutional Convention, James Madison
did rely on the national constituency for the President in making arguments that

108
For an overview of the problem, see generally Jeffrey W. Ladewig & Mathew P. Jasinski, On the
Causes and Consequences of and Remedies for Interstate Malapportionment of the U.S. House of
Representatives, 6 PERSPS. ON POL. 89 (2008). Particularly notorious is the example of Nevada, which was
admitted with a population far below the minimum needed for one representative in 1864 and continued to have
a population below the minimum until the second half of the twentieth century. See Charles Stewart III & Barry
R. Weingast, Stacking the Senate, Changing the Nation: Republican Rotten Boroughs, Statehood Politics, and
American Political Development, 6 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 223, 227, 231–32 (1992) (noting how Nevada was
characterized as “America’s Rotten Borough” in the nineteenth century because its population was so small
relative to other states, characterizing Nevada’s admission as the “most egregious effort in the nation’s history
to disregard population and economic criteria in order to admit a state for political reasons,” and noting that
“[h]ad Nevada waited until the standard population criterion had been met, of having enough population to
entitle a state to one member of the House, it would not have entered the Union until 1970”).
109
John Harrison, The Story of In re Neagle: Sex, Money, Politics, Perjury, Homicide, Federalism, and
Executive Power, in PRESIDENTIAL POWER STORIES 133, 160–61 (Christopher H. Schroeder & Curtis A. Bradley
eds., 2009).
110
RAKOVE, supra note 84, at 266 (noting that only Governour Morris argued the President could “embody
a coherent national interest” and that “[n]o one else went as far”); see also JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE
ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 141
(2012) (criticizing the idea of the President as “representative of the people” in the early Republic because of
limitations on franchise and limited campaigning).
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the President should have the power to nominate judges.111 Others made similar
points at a more general level.112
Nonetheless, the distinctive nature of how the President is elected and the
unique nature of his national constituency is important. And for our purposes, it
is important because it can be understood as reflecting a contrast between
vertical and horizontal federalism. Congress, as a collective group representing
the states, emphasizes a horizontal federalism perspective. The President, as a
single individual representing the entire country, emphasizes a vertical
federalism perspective. Given the horizontal federalism focus of Article IV, this
distinction would imply that Congress should have the primary role in
implementing Article IV.113
What might such a primary role mean in practice? At the very least, it weighs
against easily finding unilateral presidential power in this context, outside of
explicit congressional authorization. As the next Part develops, this presumption
can be overcome in the right context. This presumption is also not so strong that
it might, for instance, prevent an agency from receiving Chevron deference for
its interpretation of a relevant statute. But it is a presumption that might shift our
understandings of the baseline power of the Executive to act when there is no
explicit statement in the relevant statutory language as to executive power, just
as the courts have sometimes found greater leeway for executive action in the
face of congressional silence in the context of war or foreign affairs.

111
See 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 79, at 80–81 (stating the President should nominate judges
because the “Executive Magistrate wd [sic] be considered as a national officer, acting for and equally
sympathising with every part of the U. States,” in contrast to the Senate, where, because of equal representation
of the states, a minority might be able to appoint judges).
112
See id. at 52–53 (Morris stating “[t]he Executive therefore ought to be so constituted as to be the great
protector of the Mass of the people” and therefore needs to be independent of the legislature); id. at 82 (Morris
supporting the presidential nomination of judges by stating “[t]he Executive in the necessary intercourse with
every part of the U. S. required by the nature of his administration, will or may have the best possible
information” about which judges to nominate).
113
My distinction between the national basis for the election of the President and the state basis for the
election of members of Congress should not be taken as a claim that the President will necessarily advance
policy that is more responsive to the nation as a whole compared to Congress. How different electoral
mechanisms might produce different policy preferences or incentives for elected officials depends on a range of
additional factors. See Jide Nzelibe, The Fable of the Nationalist President and the Parochial Congress, 53
UCLA L. Rev. 1217, 1231–42 (2006) (describing political dynamics that can make Congress as a whole consider
national-level implications of policy and make presidents focus on policy implications for particular sections of
the country). My distinction simply notes that, as a matter of formal structure, the President is the only nationally
elected official in the Constitution, and that this point further supports the grant in the text of the Property Clause
of decision-making power to Congress.
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There is some irony in applying a horizontal federalism theory of Article IV
to interpreting the Property Clause. Of all the provisions of Article IV, the
Property Clause has driven the growth of the federal government the most. The
management of public lands and territories was one of the largest single
components of the federal bureaucracy in the early Republic114 and continues to
this day to be the basis for four separate federal agencies, plus the relationship
of the federal government with Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, the
Northern Mariana Islands, and American Samoa. But as noted in the prior Part,
this growth in the federal government was born by a desire to resolve a
horizontal federalism problem—the federal government was needed as a neutral
party between the states to manage the lands held in common by the states and
ensure the creation of new, independent states.115 And like congressional power
under the Admissions Clause, congressional power under the Property Clause
over federal territories has been historically justified by some courts and scholars
as needed (and limited) to support the development of political entities that could
become members of the Union as states116—an argument that connects to the
horizontal federalism problem of admitting new states to the Union.117

114
GREGORY ABLAVSKY, FEDERAL GROUND: GOVERNING PROPERTY AND VIOLENCE IN THE FIRST U.S.
TERRITORIES 5 (2021) (“The territories were unique sites of federal authority[;] . . . many of the new federal
government’s nationwide responsibilities concentrated there.”); Antonin Scalia, Sovereign Immunity and
Nonstatutory Review of Federal Administrative Action: Some Conclusions from Public-Lands Cases, 68 MICH.
L. REV. 867, 882 (1970) (“In the present age, it is difficult to apprehend the former magnitude and importance
of public-lands law.”).
115
See supra Part I. Commentators at the time argued that admitting new western states to the Union by
increasing the number of states would reduce interstate conflicts and increase the power of the federal
government vis-à-vis the states. ONUF, ORIGINS, supra note 71, at 155.
116
Onuf, Territories and Statehood, supra note 71, at 1283 (“Though congressional power was
constitutionally unlimited and might appear arbitrary and despotic to settlers, its mandate was simply to prepare
a territory for statehood, the culmination of a process of political development.”); Elmer B. Adams, Causes and
Results of Our War with Spain from a Legal Standpoint, 8 YALE L.J. 119, 124, 129 (1898) (arguing that Property
Clause powers should be limited to the purpose of admitting new states and “no territory can be acquired to be
permanently governed . . . as a dependent colony”); Carman F. Randolph, Constitutional Aspects of Annexation,
12 HARV. L. REV. 291 (1898) (arguing the same); O’Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 536–38 (1933)
(relying on the temporary role of territorial governments as preparation for statehood to uphold the creation of
non-Article III territorial courts). This justification is in sharp tension with case law that limited the application
of the Constitution to territories such as the Philippines and Puerto Rico. See, e.g., Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S.
244, 263, 277–79 (1901); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 142 (1904). That case law drew on racist
preconceptions about the ability of non-Anglo-American communities to self-govern and on the desire to
establish an American empire that did not require eventual self-governance for all its components, and therefore
rejected arguments that congressional power over territories was limited to facilitating the entry of territories
into statehood. Juan R. Torruella, The Insular Cases: The Establishment of a Regime of Political Apartheid, 29
U. PA. J. INT’L L. 283, 286, 291–96 (2007).
117
Arguments about the obligation of the federal government to admit territories to statehood have been
used also to contest federal ownership of public lands within states. See infra Part III.C.
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There is much more to work out about the possible meaning and implications
of understanding Article IV as a coherent and unified component of the U.S.
Constitution. This Article only sketches a tentative, initial argument. But even
this tentative and initial argument indicates that structural arguments likely cut
against broad claims of executive power under the Property Clause.
C. Executive Management Power
Does the primacy of Congress in implementing the Property Clause and a
tentative understanding of Article IV as a whole mean that there is no role for
executive discretion to play in implementing the Clause? The answer to that
question is no. Given the logistical challenges of managing millions of acres of
federal lands, addressing the myriad complications of day-to-day management
choices, and navigating unforeseen on-the-ground circumstances, the President
must necessarily play some role in filling in the gaps of the statutory commands
issued by Congress.
As an example, consider the broad powers that Congress has over the
territories. As the Supreme Court has noted, Congress functions as the general
government over the territories, like a state government over a county.118 Given
the challenges of managing territorial governments, delegation by Congress to
the Executive, whether explicit or implicit, is inevitable. Unless Congress is
going to pass legislation, for example, to create counties and cities, regulate
land-use, provide for full penal codes, run public schools, and more, Congress
will necessarily have to delegate these kinds of powers to some sort of territorial
government. This issue would have been obvious to the drafters of the
Constitution, who were aware of the Northwest Ordinance and the governance
structure it created for the territories north and west of the Ohio River.
As with territorial governance, management of federal public lands
necessarily requires management decision-making that is interstitial to any
statutory regime.119 Courts have therefore at times noted that the President acts
118
See, e.g., Nat’l Bank v. County of Yankton, 101 U.S. 129, 133 (1879) (“The Territories are but political
subdivisions of the outlying dominion of the United States. Their relation to the general government is much the
same as that which counties bear to the respective States, and Congress may legislate for them as a State does
for its municipal organizations.”).
119
Getches explained the following:

[T]he obligation to protect public resources demands that the land management agencies be
relatively unfettered in carrying out their duty. It is not practical for Congress, charged by the
Constitution with ultimate responsibility for management and disposal of extensive public lands,
to do any more than to set broad policies. Consequently, Congress must entrust the executive
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as an “agent” for Congress in the management of the federal government’s
“proprietary” interests in its lands and has broad power to interpret and apply
law in this context.120
The constitutional necessity of residual executive management discretion
has been developed in a range of contexts. Courts have more broadly noted the
importance of executive discretion in the context of property and other forms of
day-to-day government management.121 Henry Monaghan developed a version
of the concept when he articulated that the Executive necessarily had a
“protective power,” independent of explicit congressional authorization, to
shield the institutions, personnel, and assets of the U.S. government from

with responsibility for implementing those policies. In turn, reviewing courts regularly defer to
an administrative official’s plausible interpretation of how legislation should be implemented,
including the official’s view of the scope of his delegated authority.
Getches, supra note 21, at 289; see also United States v. Midwest Oil, 236 U.S. 459, 474 (1915) (in discussing
the public land laws, noting the need for executive power to respond to any “[e]mergencies [that] may occur, or
conditions [that] may so change”); Note, Implied Authority of the President to Withdraw Public Lands from
Entry, 28 HARV. L. REV. 613, 615 (1915) (characterizing Midwest Oil as “merely a judicial recognition of the
fact that Congress is as likely as any other property owner, busy with affairs, to employ a general administrative
agent whose authority is implied from the principal’s acquiescence”); Bruff, supra note 21, at 503 (“[T]he
function of managing a vast and diverse collection of federal lands has always seemed to call for flexible
administration, for it demands attention to local needs and changing conditions as the manager balances priorities
among many competing uses.”).
120
For case law describing the President as an agent of Congress acting to implement a trust that Congress
holds over the lands for the American people, and accordingly deferring to executive decisions about
management, see, e.g., United States ex rel. McLennan v. Wilbur, 283 U.S. 414, 419 (1931) (upholding refusal
to lease lands for oil and gas under withdrawals in part in “consideration of [the President’s] general powers
over the public lands as guardian of the people”); United States v. Beebe, 127 U.S. 338, 342 (1888) (holding
that the Attorney General has power to file suit to undo land patent for fraud because “[t]he public domain is
held by the government as part of its trust. The government is charged with the duty and clothed with the power
to protect it from trespass and unlawful appropriation”); United States v. Trinidad Coal & Coking Co., 137 U.S.
160, 170 (1890) (upholding a lawsuit by the Executive to enforce a land disposal statute because the public lands
“were held in trust for all the people; and in making regulations for disposing of them, Congress took no thought
of their pecuniary value, but, in the discharge of a high public duty and in the interest of the whole country,
sought to develop the [country’s] material resources”); Midwest Oil, 236 U.S. at 474 (“The power of the
Executive, as agent in charge, to retain that property from sale need not necessarily be expressed in writing.”).
121
For case law specific to property management, see Springer v. Gov’t of Philippine Islands, 277 U.S.
189, 203 (1928) (finding property management to be an executive power in resolving a dispute over whether the
Executive Branch of the Philippine government can manage a corporation). The principle also applies in other
management contexts. See, e.g., United States v. Tingey, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 115, 121 (1831) (holding it appropriate
for the Executive to enter into bond without explicit statutory authority); United States v. Macdaniel, 32 U.S. (5
Pet.) 1, 2 (1833) (upholding an executive decision with respect to staffing and pay that proceeded without express
statutory authority); Contractors Ass’n of E. Pa. v. Sec’y of Lab., 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir. 1971) (holding that the
President has power to adjust terms of contracts if not in violation of law); see also Henry P. Monaghan, The
Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 57–58 (1993) (arguing that “[w]ell before Midwest
Oil, the Supreme Court had endorsed a spacious conception of the Executive’s ‘managerial’ power to fill in the
details of statutes”).
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attack.122 Jack Goldsmith and John Manning identified the President’s
“completion power” to implement constitutional or statutory powers invested in
the President.123 This “completion power” is independent of explicit
congressional authorization, instruction, or prohibition.124 Other scholars, in
passing, have also noted the possibility.125 But in the context of the Property
Clause, where congressional power is at its possible maximum and where
management is also essential and requires flexibility, the need for some residual
executive power becomes clear.
III. APPLICATIONS TO PROPERTY CLAUSE CONFLICTS
The constitutional context developed in Part II can help provide a basis for
addressing the disputes introduced in Part I. The textual grant of power to
Congress in the Clause, combined with a horizontal federalism understanding of
Article IV as a whole, leads towards restricting the scope of executive power to
act without congressional authorization. In tension to some extent with that
principle is the necessity of some foundational discretion for the Executive in
implementing the Clause on a day-to-day basis. The tension can be resolved by
recognizing that executive power should be broader where the stakes are
lower—where the result of executive discretion will not be the divestment of
federal ownership or control of land or resources, a relatively irreversible step.
In contrast, where executive discretion would facilitate the protection or
preservation of federal control over resources, or would advance effective

122
See Monaghan, supra note 121, at 58 (“Surely, acting under the most general statutes or under no
statute at all, the executive could prescribe rules for regulating access to federal buildings or land.”).
123
Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The President’s Completion Power, 115 YALE L.J. 2280, 2282
(2006).
124
Id.
125
Then Harvard Law professor Elena Kagan explained the following:

Most executive orders, significant and insignificant alike, involved . . . the administration of
public lands, the public workforce, or other public operations . . . . The President in these cases . . .
asserted his right as head of the executive branch to determine how its internal processes and
constituent units were to function.
Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2291–92 (2001); see also Michael B.
Rappaport, The Selective Nondelegation Doctrine and the Line Item Veto: A New Approach to the Nondelegation
Doctrine and Its Implications for Clinton v. City of New York, 76 TULANE L. REV. 265, 314, 363–65 (2001)
(arguing that the Executive has broad discretion in the context of contracts, obligations, and debts so long as
there is broad statutory authority, and that this supports excluding these areas from the nondelegation doctrine);
Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 132,
137 (1999) (“Because presidents are executives, they must be (and in practice are) regarded as having certain
legal prerogatives that allow them to do what executives do: manage, coordinate, staff, collect information, plan,
reconcile conflicting values, and respond quickly and flexibly to emerging problems.”).
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management of those resources, leeway for the Executive is consistent with
congressional primacy—at least unless Congress has spoken to the contrary.
In the context of preemption and the retention of federal land ownership
within the borders of admitted states, the history of the Property Clause as a
resolution to the dispute between the states over western land claims helps
provide a constitutional grounding in support of federal land ownership. The
federal government was selected as the medium to own and manage the lands as
an arbiter between the states—that role does not require disregarding the power
that the Supremacy Clause grants to federal laws, nor does it require divesting
the federal government of land ownership or legislative power under the Clause
once a state is admitted to the Union.
A. Protecting Federal Title
To help explicate the line between congressional primacy and executive
power in the context of the Property Clause and its relationship to the protection
of federal title to lands, this section draws on the President’s withdrawal
power—a power that extends to the early days of public land management in the
United States and is connected to the controversies over both national
monuments and fossil-fuel leasing. In so doing, this section shows that a
horizontal federalism understanding of Article IV constitutionally requires that
only explicit congressional action can divest the federal government of title to
the public domain. Conversely, executive discretion in the public lands context
must be limited to actions that would protect federal title, or at least not result in
the divestiture of federal title. This line between congressional primacy and
executive power distinguishes between unilateral presidential abolition of
national monuments, which threatens federal title without explicit congressional
authorization and so exceeds presidential power, and unilateral presidential
termination of existing fossil fuel leases, which protects federal title and is
permissible so long as there is not an explicit congressional prohibition of
executive action.
This section begins by providing a historical overview of the executive
withdrawal power, which protects lands from disposal or sale. It demonstrates
that the history of this withdrawal power is consistent with congressional
primacy over the public lands under the Property Clause and that the scope of
executive withdrawal power is consistent with requiring explicit congressional
authorization for the disposal of federal lands. It concludes by noting how this
distinction—between executive action that protects federal title and executive
action that threatens federal title—supports distinguishing between the illegality
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of unilateral executive termination of national monuments and the legality of
unilateral executive termination of existing fossil fuel leases.
Withdrawals are actions that remove public lands from the operation of
disposal statutes.126 As noted in Part I, a range of laws throughout the nineteenth
century allowed individuals and corporations to obtain public lands when certain
conditions were met. Withdrawal of public lands meant categorizing certain
lands as exempt from some or all of these disposal statutes—withdrawals were
typically done by the President or subordinate executive branch officials.127 Up
through the middle of the twentieth century, withdrawals were a major
component of public lands law and policy in the United States.128 The
Antiquities Act is among one of the many statutes that explicitly authorized
withdrawals by the President.129 Other withdrawal laws included the creation of
military and Indian reservations,130 leasing of lands for valuable mineral
resources,131 protection of natural resources such as forests,132 and granting of
land subsidies for railroad construction.133 Withdrawals are generally less
relevant today because most of the disposal statutes were repealed in 1976 when
Congress confirmed the policy of retaining ownership of the public lands.134 A
few statutes remain that allow for the disposal of property interests in public
lands for mining activities, and relatedly for the leasing of public lands for fossil

126

See Getches, supra note 21, at 285–86.
Id.
128
See KLEIN ET AL., supra note 26, at 70–71.
129
See Antiquities Act of 1906, 54 U.S.C.A. § 320301.
130
Wilcox v. Jackson, 38 U.S. 498, 512–13 (1839). Congressional approval was often found to be implicit
and retrospective, based on funding for maintenance of reserved areas or on disposal statutes that excluded areas
withdrawn or reserved by presidential action. See Grisar v. McDowell, 73 U.S. 363, 381 (1867) (“The action of
the President in making the reservations in question was indirectly approved by the legislation of Congress in
appropriating moneys for the construction of fortifications and other public works upon them.”).
131
Lands in the 1820s were withdrawn to allow for leasing of the lands for lead mining. LEONARD D.
WHITE, THE JEFFERSONIANS: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY 1801-1829, at 515–16 (1951).
132
See 26 Stat. 1103 (1891) (original statute authorizing presidential creation of forest reserves).
133
Congress funded railroad construction in the western United States by providing grants of federal lands
to railroad corporations in return for construction. This approach required preventing other claimants from taking
the lands that, eventually, were to be transferred to the railroad along the route once the railroad was constructed.
Congress often authorized withdrawal of (and the President sometimes unilaterally withdrew) lands along
railroad routes beginning in the 1850s. LESHY, supra note 71, at 55–57; Darwin P. Roberts, The Legal History
of Federally Granted Railroad Rights-of-Way and the Myth of Congress’s “1871 Shift,” 82 U. COLO. L. REV.
85, 118–20 (2011); GATES, supra note 86, at 181–82; see also Wood v. Beach, 156 U.S. 548, 551 (1895)
(upholding withdrawal in aid of railroad legislation).
134
See Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-579, §§ 701–06 (repealing many
public lands disposal laws); see also 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(1) (declaring it the policy of Congress that “the public
lands be retained in Federal ownership”). In practice, most disposal statutes had become mostly inoperative after
1934, when President Franklin Roosevelt withdrew most of the public lands under the authorization of the Taylor
Grazing Act, which provided for leasing of public lands for grazing. See KLEIN ET AL., supra note 26, at 360.
127
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fuel and other mineral extraction activities.135 The concept of withdrawal is still
relevant to the extent that it removes public lands from the operation of these
statutes. Congress in 1976 also provided a procedural framework to guide and
constrain presidential withdrawal powers, repealing most other withdrawal
statutes, but retaining the Antiquities Act.136
One ground for the withdrawal power has been statutory grants of power by
Congress to the Executive.137 However, particularly from 1900 onwards,
presidents began to claim the authority to unilaterally withdraw lands from the
operation of disposal statutes without any congressional authorization,138 often
on the grounds that presidential intervention was needed to maintain the status
quo pending congressional action.139 The source of this claimed authority
varied—sometimes it was framed as a constitutional power inherent in the
President, and sometimes as a power that the President had regularly asserted
and had been acquiesced in by congressional inaction.140

135
See Mason v. United States, 260 U.S. 545, 552–54 (1923) (holding that mining claims are a form of
“appropriation” covered by a withdrawal); LESHY, supra note 31, at 35, 39–40.
136
Getches, supra note 21, at 280.
137
See supra notes 129–33 and accompanying text.
138
See WHEATLEY, supra note 119, at 82 (providing overview); DOUGLAS BRINKLEY, THE WILDERNESS
WARRIOR: THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND THE CRUSADE FOR AMERICA 442–47, 491–92, 501–02, 570–71, 712,
718–19, 726, 737–38, 747–48 (2009) (providing examples); LESHY, supra note 71 (arguing the same). Examples
exist earlier in history, and the Court in Midwest Oil relied heavily on a range of examples over time. United
States v. Midwest Oil, 236 U.S. 459, 470 (1915). President Roosevelt aggressively used withdrawal powers to
create wildlife refuges. See, e.g., BRINKLEY, supra; LESHY, supra note 71. Leshy argues that these reservations
had statutory authorization, but also notes subsequent legislation that authorized such withdrawals. Id. But see
Britton-Purdy, supra note 38 (arguing that these reservations were “unauthorized”).
139
Withdrawal in aid of legislation was a common basis for presidential withdrawals, preventing disposal
of lands before Congress had a chance to decide how to resolve a policy or legal question about whether to
protect the lands from disposal. President Taft used this rationale in the early 1900s when he withdrew large
areas of land with oil and gas reserves to prevent their disposal into private hands—the withdrawal that prompted
the Midwest Oil case, discussed infra. See President Howard Taft, Message Regarding Environmental Protection
(Jan. 14, 1910) (message to Congress) (transcript available through the American Presidency Project, U.C. Santa
Barbara). President Theodore Roosevelt used this power frequently as well. LESHY, supra note 55 (noting
withdrawals to protect energy resources); JOHN ISE, THE UNITED STATES FOREST POLICY 270–71 (1920) (noting
withdrawals to protect energy resources, with the justification of “pending the enactment [further] of
legislation”); BENJAMIN HORACE HIBBARD, A HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC LAND POLICIES 506–07 (1924) (noting
that in the early twentieth century there were “numerous orders by the President, or by the Secretary of the
Interior, withdrawing from entry certain classes of land pending legislation by Congress”). Withdrawal in aid of
legislation was used earlier, such as in the case of conflicting land grants in Iowa in the late nineteenth century.
Wolcott v. Des Moines Co., 72 U.S. 681, 688–89 (1866) (finding implicit authority of the Executive to be able
to reserve lands to protect purpose of land disposal statutes); Bullard v. Des Moines & Ft. Dodge R.R., 122 U.S.
167, 174 (1887).
140
CHARLES F. WHEATLEY, JR., 1 STUDY OF WITHDRAWALS AND RESERVATIONS OF PUBLIC DOMAIN
LANDS 131–50 (1969) (providing an overview of those arguments).
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The Supreme Court upheld presidential withdrawal power on the basis of
congressional acquiescence in the Midwest Oil case in 1915,141 shortly after
Congress had passed legislation to provide a comprehensive statutory basis and
framework for presidential withdrawal powers.142 In 1976, Congress explicitly
rejected any inherent presidential power to withdraw lands and provided
elaborate procedural mechanisms to structure withdrawal powers.143
Withdrawals therefore provide a rich historical context for exploring the
borders between legislative and executive power. The history both shows regular
congressional intervention as well as executive efforts to assert unilateral power
to act, efforts that were recognized in part by the Supreme Court.
Even more illuminating is an examination of claims by the Executive to
revoke withdrawals and therefore open lands back up to disposal. Generally,
presidents have not asserted the power to undo withdrawals that had been
undertaken pursuant to powers explicitly authorized by Congress.144 This is true
141
Midwest Oil, 236 U.S. at 459. The Court concluded that there was a long history of withdrawals by the
President without explicit statutory authority and that this practice evidenced congressional acquiescence in
unilateral presidential withdrawal power. Id. at 469–70. The dissent claimed that there was implicit or explicit
statutory authorization for most if not all of these withdrawals. Id. at 489–92 (Day, J., dissenting). The Court
declined to address claims that there was a constitutional basis for unilateral presidential withdrawal power. Id.
at 492. The horizontal theory of Article IV would cut against such a claim. See also Getches, supra note 21, at
286 (“But arguments that the executive has some inherent constitutional authority to make withdrawals of public
lands are without merit.”). The Supreme Court has never endorsed such a theory. Id. at 286–87 n.46; Note,
Implied Authority of the President to Withdraw Public Lands from Entry, 28 HARV. L. REV 613, 614 (1915)
(rejecting a constitutional basis for withdrawal power); James R. Rasband, The Future of the Antiquities Act, 21
J. LAND RES. & ENV’T L. 619, 625 (2001) (“The Supreme Court has never suggested that the President has
inherent withdrawal authority.”). Lower court claims to the contrary are usually based on incorrect
interpretations of Midwest Oil. See Shaw v. Work, 9 F.2d 1014, 1015 (D.C. Cir. 1925); Portland Gen. Elec. Co.
v. Kleppe, 441 F. Supp. 859, 861 (D. Wyo. 1977)
142
A few years before Midwest Oil, Congress passed the Pickett Act, which provided an explicit statutory
basis for presidential withdrawal powers and limits on those powers. Act of June 15, 1910, ch. 421, 36 Stat. 847.
However, the President continued to assert unilateral withdrawal powers, on both constitutional and statutory
grounds—for the latter, by broadly construing executive authority under the Act, leading subsequent courts to
conclude that congressional acquiescence was still in place. Getches, supra note 21, at 294–98; Kleppe, 441 F.
Supp. at 861; Reservation of Public Lands for Migratory Bird Refuge, 37 U.S. Op. Att’y Gen. 502, 1934 WL
1231 (1934) (“There is no specific statutory authority for the issuance of the proposed Executive order. It is well
established, however, that the President has the power to reserve or withdraw lands from the public domain for
public purposes.”).
143
See 43 U.S.C. § 1714 (2014) (restricting withdrawal powers). Congress in the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA) explicitly disclaimed any acquiescence in non-statutory presidential
withdrawal powers as identified in Midwest Oil. FLPMA, Pub. L. 94-579, § 704(a).
144
For executive branch statements, see, e.g., Transfer of National Monuments to National Park Service
in the Department of the Interior, 36 U.S. Op. Att’y Gen. 75, 79 (1929) (“This Department has frequently ruled
that, in the absence of authority from Congress, the President may not restore to the public domain lands which
have been reserved for a particular purpose, nor transfer their control from one Department to another.”). For
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for the designation of military reservations145 as well as for National Forests146—
in both cases the individual units were designated by the President pursuant to
an overarching statutory authority, similar to the Antiquities Act. I have not
found any examples of a court upholding a presidential revocation of a
withdrawal originally authorized pursuant to a statute.147
case law making this point, see, e.g., United States v. Tichenor, 12 F. 415, 421 (D. Or. 1882) (“If there was a
valid reservation established at Port Orford prior to September 11, 1854, for a military post[] . . . the land
contained in it was thereby appropriated and withdrawn from the public domain, and could not be thereafter
otherwise appropriated, except by the authority of congress.”); S. Pac. R.R. v. Groeck, 87 F. 970, 974 (9th Cir.
1898) (stating if a withdrawal is mandated by law, then “the secretary of the interior is powerless to . . . set[]
aside his order of withdrawal. . . . After such lands have once been set aside by congressional act, no authority
is vested in the secretary of the interior . . . to restore them”); S. Pac. R.R. Co. v. Wiggs, 43 F. 333 (N.D. Cal.
1890). But see United States v. R.R. Bridge Co., 27 F. Cas. 686, 690 (N.D. Ill. 1855) (“[I]t does not follow, that
where the government reserves its own land from sale, for any public purpose that a special act of congress after
its abandonment is necessary for the sale of it.”).
In the Indian reservation context, clear statutory authorization is required for the President to terminate
a reservation created by an executive order, based on congressional legislation that has protected those
reservations. Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 189, 194 n.5 (1999); United
States v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 543 F.2d 676, 686 n.15 (9th Cir. 1976) (stating that legislation in 1919 and 1927
prohibited termination or shrinking of EO reservations). Prior to that legislation, Supreme Court decisions found
that in some circumstances, reservations created by executive orders might be terminated by the President or
Congress without compensation. Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United States, 316 U.S. 317, 331 (1942); Confederate
Bands of Ute Indians v. United States, 330 U.S. 169, 176 (1947). Reservations created by statute or treaty can
only be shrunk or eliminated by Congress. 1 COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 15.09[1][b] (Nell
Jessup Newton et al. eds., 2012 ed.).
145
For statements that military reservations depended on congressional authorization, see Rock Island
Mil. Rsrv., 10 U.S. Op. Att’y Gen. 359, 361 (1862) (“This selection of Rock Island for military purposes was
not, as we have seen, the unauthorized act of the President; but was made in the exercise of a discretion vested
in him by Congress.”). For statements that military reservations cannot be undone by the President once
designated, see id. at 363; Camp Wright, 16 U.S. Op. Att’y Gen. 121, 123 (1878); Naval Rsrv. Restoration to
Pub. Domain, 21 U.S. Op. Att’y Gen. 120, 121 (1895); Mil. Rsrv. at Fort Fetterman, 17 U.S. Op. Att’y Gen.
168, 168–69 (1881).
146
Under the original statute authorizing presidential designation of National Forests, there was no explicit
grant of authority to the President to revoke or shrink those designations. Such power was eventually granted in
the Forest Service Organic Act, partly in response to doubts about presidential power here. See Britton-Purdy,
supra note 38 (providing overview); WHEATLEY, supra note 140, at 282 (“Nor, it would appear, does the
President have power to modify or revoke forest reserves effected by him pursuant to some specific delegation
of authority other than the Act of 1891.”); Forest Service Organic Act of 1897, ch. 2, 30 Stat. 34, 36 (codified
as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 473). Some have argued that the text of the statute—which specified the power of
the President to revoke National Forest proclamations “to remove any doubt which may exist pertaining to the
authority of the President thereunto,” Forest Service Organic Act of 1897, ch. 2, 30 Stat. 30, 34—means that no
firm conclusions should be drawn from this action by Congress. See Yoo & Gaziano, supra note 21, at 631.
However, other statutes granting presidential withdrawal powers had revocation provisions, including statutes
contemporaneous with the Antiquities Act, implying that Congress did think an explicit grant of revocation
power was required. See Rasband, supra note 141, at 627.
147
The most thorough survey of withdrawal practices concluded that when “land is withdrawn by statute
and the statute contains no authority to revoke the withdrawal or if the statute authorizes the Executive to
withdraw lands after certain criteria have been met but contains no authority to revoke the withdrawal,” there is
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Since President Theodore Roosevelt greatly expanded the use of
withdrawals without any explicit statutory authorization, subsequent presidents
have unilaterally revoked those types of withdrawals,148 a supportable outcome
since the initial withdrawals were not pursuant to congressional authorization.
Piecing this historical practice together produces the following synthesis:
Absent explicit congressional authorization or prohibition, the President may
have power to withdraw lands from the disposal statutes; however, the President
must have explicit congressional authorization to revoke a congressionally
authorized or mandated withdrawal.
Support for this synthesis comes from case law in which courts have required
explicit statutory authority for the disposal of property pursuant to the Property
Clause and rejected efforts by executive branch officials to dispose of federal
lands unilaterally.149 John Leshy has argued that this principle of statutory
interpretation that reads statutes against finding divestiture of federal lands
without clear statements by Congress is based in a “constitutional common law”
doctrine for which the Court “has never fully articulated a rationale.”150 Leshy
has reasoned that the principle stems from the judicial recognition of the political
imbalance among the various players in public lands politics, “a largely
no consensus over whether “the Executive’s authority to revoke the withdrawal order and restore the land.”
WHEATLEY, supra note 140, at A-8. However, the only judicial cases cited by the author find no executive power
to revoke withdrawals without explicit congressional authorization to do so. Id. at A-9 nn.27–28. The other
citations finding executive power to revoke withdrawals are administrative decisions within the Interior
Department. Id.
148
WHEATLEY, supra note 140, at A-9 (“[S]ince the President was authorized to withdraw land from the
public domain for public purposes, this authority necessarily implies the power to revoke the withdrawal when
it has served its purpose”); Rasband, supra note 141, at 625–26.
149
See, e.g., Royal Indemnity Co. v. United States, 313 U.S. 289, 294 (1941) (“Power to release or
otherwise dispose of the rights and property of the United States is lodged in the Congress by the Constitution.
Subordinate officers . . . are without that power, save only as it has been conferred upon them by Act of Congress
. . . .”); Greene Cnty. Planning Bd. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 559 F.2d 1227, 1234–35, 1239 (1976); Equity Tr.
Co. v. McDonald, 806 F.3d 833, 834 (5th Cir. 2015) (“This Property Clause of the Constitution vests in the
legislature ‘“the absolute right to prescribe” the manner in which its property is transferred.’ . . . Absent
congressional permission, government officials may not ‘release or otherwise dispose of’ government
property.”); Spirit Lake Tribe v. North Dakota, 262 F.3d 732, 740 (8th Cir. 2001) (concluding that the United
States “cannot abandon property without congressional authorization”); Int’l Aircraft Recovery v. Unidentified,
Wrecked, and Abandoned Aircraft, 218 F.3d 1255, 1258 (11th Cir. 2000); Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Bureau
of Reclamation, 599 F.3d 1165, 1185 (10th Cir. 2010); see also Rock Island Mil. Rsrv., 10 U.S. Op. Att’y Gen.
359, 361 (1862) (“[T]he power to dispose of the public lands under this clause, whether by sale or by
appropriation to other uses, belongs to Congress, and not to the President.” (citation omitted)). But see Edwards
v. Carter, 580 F.2d 1055, 1061–63 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (holding that the Property Clause is not the exclusive manner
by which property can be transferred to foreign countries and identifying the Treaty Clause as an alternative
approach). Edwards can be understood as allowing disposal if an alternative constitutional basis for presidential
or congressional authority for action exists. This may be most plausible in the foreign relations context.
150
Leshy, supra note 21, at 1105–13.
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unarticulated but realistic assessment of the pressures brought to bear on the
Congress (and, to some extent, the executive) in making federal land policy
decisions” that “the political power possessed by privatization advocates”
required a firm judicial counterweight.151
The principle of requiring explicit congressional authorization for disposal
of federal lands applies beyond interpretation of the language of statutes. The
Court in Midwest Oil found it significant that the non-statutory withdrawal
actions that the President undertook would protect against disposal of valuable
public resources, allowing for a broad construction of executive power in the
absence of explicit statutory authorization or prohibition:
But when it appeared that the public interest would be served by
withdrawing or reserving parts of the public domain, nothing was more
natural than to retain what the government already owned. And in
making such orders, which were thus useful to the public, no private
interest was injured. For, prior to the initiation of some right given by
law, the citizen had no enforceable interest in the public statute, and
no private right in land which was the property of the people. The
President was in a position to know when the public interest required
particular portions of the people’s lands to be withdrawn from entry or
location; his action inflicted no wrong upon any private citizen, and
being subject to disaffirmance by Congress, could occasion no harm
to the interest of the public at large.152

In other words, we might wish to broadly defer to presidential withdrawal
powers in areas where Congress has not spoken directly because it protects
congressional power to decide how to use the public lands later on by preventing
disposal.153
Based on the analysis in Part II, at least two constitutional arguments
underpin the principle that courts should be reluctant to find implicit statutory
authorization for divestiture of federal public lands. First, the text of the Property
Clause gives Congress power to “dispose” of the public lands.154 This grant of

151

Id. at 1111–12.
United States v. Midwest Oil, 236 U.S. 459, 471 (1915). The Court also implied that acquiescence
would not apply to disposal of public lands, consistent with case law that rejects executive power to dispose
absent explicit statutory authority. Id. at 473–74 (distinguishing a situation where the Executive unilaterally acts
such “that private rights could be created by an officer withdrawing for a Rail Road more than had been
authorized by Congress in the land grant act”).
153
Getches, supra note 21, at 280, 287 (“To allow uses without some delegation of authority from
Congress arguably usurps the authority of the legislative branch under the Property Clause. To deny private uses,
on the other hand, preserves congressional prerogatives and flexibility.”).
154
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
152
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textual power with specificity as to disposal could be understood as reserving to
Congress the power to decide when and how to divest ownership through sale
or grant. Disposal, however, likely had a broader meaning than simply
divestiture of ownership to the drafters of the Constitution.155 Thus, the better
understanding of the import of the textual grant of primacy to Congress with
respect to disposal and the power to enact “needful rules and regulations”156 for
the public lands is a practical one—divestiture is a drastic step that transfers
ownership from the federal government to another party, and is in some ways
irreversible.157 A revocation of a withdrawal in essence opens up public lands to
divestiture from the federal government—protecting congressional primacy
with respect to both disposal and the power to enact needful rules and regulations
would mean that we should be leery of allowing executive discretion, absent
clear congressional authorization, to advance divestiture of federal lands.
The same conclusions are also supported by the second argument, a
“horizontal federalism” understanding of Article IV, which likewise emphasizes
congressional primacy with respect to implementation of the Clause. This
horizontal federalism understanding of the role of the Property Clause within
Article IV provides a structural constitutional basis for the policy-based
argument that Leshy develops and dovetails with it, as both the horizontal
federalism understanding and Leshy’s argument recognize the importance of
preventing the loss of federal public resources without explicit congressional
authorization.158
Applying the principles above allows us to distinguish between the two
examples for considering executive power under the Property Clause introduced
in Part I: the revocation of national monuments and the termination of fossil fuel
leases. As noted above, the creation of national monuments is a form of
withdrawal power.159 The statute does not give the President the authority to
155

See Leshy, supra note 9.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
157
Divestiture is reversible only through (1) a consensual sale or gift by the new owner, or (2) the use of
eminent domain by the government.
158
This analysis also provides a basis for distinguishing between federal acquisition of lands, where the
Court has never required a clear statutory authorization for acquisition, and divestiture, even though the text of
the Property Clause does not provide for such a distinction. See Leshy, supra note 21, at 1110 (noting this
dichotomy).
159
Contra Yoo & Gaziano, supra note 21, at 636 (claiming that monument proclamations are different
from withdrawals). For instance, national monuments today protect designated lands from disposal under the
Hard Rock Mining Act, a statute that authorizes the creation of at least a limited property right for individuals
and entities that undertake mining operations on public lands. See LESHY, supra note 31, at 35, 39–40 (noting
the history of the Act as a disposal statute and that the definition of withdrawals under FLPMA includes
removing lands from the operation of the Mining Act).
156
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undo the creation of national monuments.160 Similar statutes that give only the
power to create, not revoke withdrawals, have been interpreted as not implicitly
giving the President the power to revoke withdrawals—where this has been
identified as a problem, Congress resolved the situation by amending the statutes
to grant revocation powers to the President.161 Identifying an implied revocation
power would be a significant expansion of presidential power in tension with
congressional primacy under Article IV because it would facilitate the disposal
of lands without explicit congressional authorization.162
In contrast, executive power to terminate fossil fuel leases leads to a very
different conclusion. Leases are both transfers of property rights (like sale),
albeit limited in time, as well as contracts. And as contracts, leases necessarily
require decision-making by the Executive Branch about how to structure the
terms, when to enter into them, and when to terminate them.
160
There have been presidential actions to diminish national monuments since the enactment of the
Antiquities Act but none have been litigated in court, none occurred between President Kennedy and President
Trump, and the vast majority of such presidential actions involved minor corrections to monument boundaries
or efforts to improve resource protection within the monuments. See Ruple, supra note 37. The most substantial
revisions were in Glacier Bay, Alaska and Mt. Olympus, Washington, both justified on military grounds. Id. at
70–75. Congress has also enacted specific legislation authorizing the modification of particular monuments. Id.
at 28–30.
161
See James R. Rasband, Stroke of the Pen, Law of the Land?, 63 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 21-1, 21-20
(2017) (making this point); Ruple, supra note 37, at 26–29.
162
Two commentators have argued that there is a general presumption in American constitutional law that
when Congress grants authority to the President to take an action, the President has the authority to revoke that
action unless Congress has specifically prohibited revocation. Yoo & Gaziano, supra note 21, at 639–47. Even
if such a general presumption exists, the analysis in this Article indicates that in the context of Article IV and
the Property Clause, such a presumption should not apply when it comes to the disposal of property by the
Executive. Similarly, these commentators have argued that “Congress is also constitutionally prohibited from
delegating a statutory power to the President and then micromanaging the discretion granted.” Id. at 646. Again,
even assuming this assertion is true in general, the analysis in this Article indicates the limits of this claim in the
context of Article IV and the Property Clause. Congressional supremacy with respect to disposal of federal
property should allow significant congressional power to constrain executive discretion to act, even where (as
discussed infra) the President may have default discretion to act in their managerial capacity.
A recent opinion by Chief Justice John Roberts raises the question of whether the Antiquities Act has
been used overly broadly by the President to designate new monuments. In a statement accompanying the denial
of certiorari in an unsuccessful lawsuit challenging the creation of a marine national monument off the coast of
New England, Roberts questioned whether the broad designation of monuments protecting submerged lands and
ecosystems was consistent with the Act’s requirement that designations “must be limited to the smallest area
compatible with the care and management of the objects to be protected.” Mass. Lobstermen’s Ass’n v.
Raimondo, No. 20–97, slip op. at 3 (Mar. 22, 2021). Roberts questioned whether the Antiquities Act “has been
transformed into a power without any discernible limit to set aside vast and amorphous expanses of terrain above
and below the sea.” Id. However, a broad understanding of presidential power to designate monuments under
the Antiquities Act would be generally consistent with the horizontal federalism framework developed in this
Article. The Act is an explicit congressional authorization to the President to designate monuments, and a broad
interpretation of presidential power under the Act would be consistent with protecting federal title from being
divested improperly.
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Thus, they implicate more directly the managerial, interstitial powers of the
President and the Executive Branch that are inherent in the implementation of
the Property Clause. The Supreme Court has upheld unilateral executive power
to terminate contracts, at least absent congressional prohibition or restriction of
that power.163
There are historical precedents for unilateral executive power in the context
of determining the specific terms for contracts involving public lands
transactions. President Andrew Jackson required all payments for public lands
sales to be made in gold or silver (“specie”) rather than in bank notes.164 The
decision was extremely controversial.165 The policy had been specifically
rejected by Congress a few months before, although Congress had not passed
legislation prohibiting presidential action,166 and one of Jackson’s few
congressional supporters on the topic said that Jackson waited until Congress
adjourned to issue the policy because of “fear that Congress would counteract it
by law.”167 Multiple leading senators argued that the policy was unconstitutional
as infringing on congressional powers under the Property Clause.168 Eventually
the policy was overturned by congressional legislation,169 and it was never
challenged in court. Even with that controversy, however, Jackson’s policy

163

United States v. Corliss Steam-Engine Co., 91 U.S. 321, 322 (1875); see Biber & Diamond, supra note

41.
164
See GATES, supra note 86, at 175; U.S. SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, CIRCULAR TO RECEIVERS OF
PUBLIC MONEY, AND TO THE DEPOSITE BANKS (July 11, 1836), in THE FINANCIAL REGISTER OF THE UNITED
STATES 14–15 (1836) (announcement of the policy by Treasury Department). Because the policy was announced
in a Treasury Department Circulate, it is often called the Specie Circular. For additional examples of the
Executive Branch flexibly changing payment options or sale terms for public lands sales, see HIBBARD, supra
note 139, at 212; GATES, supra note 86, at 209 (GLO in 1856 temporarily stops land sales to pressure Congress
to change the law); id. at 558 (GLO sets maximum price for sales in late-nineteenth century); id. at 704–05 (War
Department changes terms for royalty payments for lead mines in Midwest in early twentieth century).
165
See Richard H. Timberlake, Jr., The Specie Circular and Distribution of the Surplus, 68 J. POL. ECON.
109, 110 (1960); see also Peter L. Rousseau, Jacksonian Monetary Policy, Specie Flows, and the Panic of 1837,
62 J. ECON. HIST. 457 (2002) (Jackson pointed to legislation from the 1810s as legal justification for his actions).
THOMAS BENTON, 1 THIRTY YEARS’ VIEW: OR, A HISTORY OF THE WORKING OF THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT
FOR THIRTY YEARS, FROM 1820 TO 1850, at 676–77 (1854) (citing A Resolution Relative to the More Effectual
Collection of the Public Revenue, 3 Stat. L., 343 (Apr. 30, 1816)).
166
Timberlake, supra note 166, at 110.
167
THOMAS BENTON, supra note 165, at 676.
168
See, e.g., 24 Cong. Reg. Deb. 93 (Dec. 21, 1836) (speech by Sen. Webster); 24 Cong. Reg. Deb. 375
(Jan. 11, 1837) (remarks by Sen. Calhoun); 24 Cong. Reg. Deb. 369, 372 (Jan. 11, 1837) (remarks by Sen. Clay).
169
Congress passed a resolution disapproving of the Circular in 1837 but Jackson refused to sign the
resolution before he left office, and it took almost two more years for Congress to pass legislation overturning
the policy. Rousseau, supra note 165, at 478; Repeal of the Specie Circular, 5 Stat. 310 (May 31, 1838).
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appropriately reflects the type of managerial decision-making that likely should
be within the power of the President, absent specific congressional direction.170
The revocation of fossil fuel leases also does not raise the same issues as
withdrawal revocations, because the revocation of leases does not open lands up
to disposal in the way that withdrawal revocations do.171 Revocations of leases
are a form of protecting public lands against disposal, something that the courts
have identified as within the powers of the Executive Branch’s authority as
“guardian of the people” and consistent with Midwest Oil.172 Thus, revocations
do not trigger the same judicial concerns about unilateral executive disposal of
federal lands and are more available to presidential discretion.
B. Preemption
As discussed in Part I, some commentators have questioned the preemptive
power of congressional legislation under the Property Clause. There is no basis
in the text of the Constitution for considering actions under the Property Clause
to have less legal authority than actions under any other clause empowering
Congress to act.173
The text of the Clause authorizes Congress to enact “needful rules and
regulations,” and some scholars have argued that “needful” is limited to the
implementation of other enumerated powers of the Constitution, drawing an
analogy to the Necessary and Proper Clause.174 But rules and regulations are
forms of legislation,175 and interpreting them differently from other

170
Jackson justified the Circular on the grounds of prevention of fraud and speculation on the public lands,
arguments that are consistent with a managerial justification for presidential action. Andrew Jackson, Eighth
Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 5, 1836) (transcript available at https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/
presidential-speeches/december-5-1836-eighth-annual-message-congress). Whether the 1816 legislation
granted discretion to the President to act, prohibited presidential action, or simply did not speak to the matter
was never litigated in court.
171
See Britton-Purdy, supra note 38, at 945–48 (describing a “presumption against presidential
privatization”).
172
See United States ex rel. McLennan v. Wilbur, 283 U.S. 414, 419 (1931) (upholding the discretion of
the Secretary of the Interior to refuse to issue prospecting licenses for oil and gas development).
173
See Appel, supra note 21, at 10 (“The Property Clause’s unconditional wording resembles that of other
broadly interpreted clauses, such as the power over immigration, patents, or foreign relations.”); Goble, supra
note 21, at 498–99; Gaetke, Refuting, supra note 21, at 635–36 n.129 (“Surely no language of the Constitution
itself supports the assertion that the article IV power is inferior to other congressional powers.”)
174
Natelson, supra note 21, at 350, 363–65 (emphasis omitted); Brodie, supra note 21, at 710–11.
175
But see United States v. Midwest Oil, 236 U.S. 459, 474 (1915) (“[T]he land laws are not of a legislative
character in the highest sense of the term (art. 4, § 3), ‘but savor somewhat of mere rules prescribed by an owner
of property for its disposal.’”). However, in the same opinion the Court recognizes that Congress has “legislative
power over the public domain.” Id.
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congressional powers would seem to downgrade the Property Clause as a lesser
enumerated power, for which there is no basis in the structure or text of the
Constitution. Moreover, the separate authorization in the Clause for Congress to
“dispose” of the public lands, under contemporary late eighteenth century
definitions of the word, could broadly include a wide range of management that
could cover current congressional legislation under the Clause.176 Nor is there
any evidence from the debates in the Convention or the ratification that would
limit the power of Property Clause legislation. While there is contradictory
language in Supreme Court case law over the years about the preemptive power
of Property Clause legislation, much of the language is dicta177 and the most
recent case law uniformly supports preemption.178

176
Leshy, supra note 9. For a scholar arguing that even congressional action pursuant to “disposal” does
not necessarily provide preemptive power, see Engdahl, supra note 21, at 367 (limiting preemption under the
disposal language to matters within the enumerated powers of Article I).
177
See Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 538–39 (1976); see also Leshy, supra note 9, at 527–30,
534–50 (summarizing the relevant case law); Appel, supra note 21, at 10–11, 32–33, 56–73 (discussing the
relevant case law); Gaetke, Refuting, supra note 21, at 638–51 (discussing the relevant case law). The scholarship
arguing against preemptive power under the Property Clause relies heavily on dicta in nineteenth century cases.
See, e.g., Engdahl, supra note 21, at 293–96, 298–99, 303 (citing and discussing case law); Leshy, supra note 9
(making this point); Goble, supra note 21, at 509.
178
See, e.g., Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 536–38. For scholars supporting the idea that federal power is preemptive,
see Gaetke, Congressional Discretion, supra note 21, at 386–87; Leshy, supra note 9.
Jeffrey Schmitt has argued that congressional debates in the first half of the nineteenth century show a
consensus that the Property Clause did not give the federal government general preemptive power within a state,
but only limited preemptive power to protect federal land ownership and disposal. Schmitt, Limiting the Property
Clause, supra note 21, at 158–64. However, most of the examples drawn on by Schmitt have limited value
because of their ambiguity. Schmitt relies on the lack of objection to the possibility of federal sovereignty around
the time of ratification, id. at 157, and notes that disputes over federal jurisdiction over its lands focused on
limitations on state power to interfere with federal land disposal, id. at 158–59. Of course, given the primacy of
disposal in federal land policy at the time, this focus is understandable. Other examples drawn on by Schmitt are
ambiguous as to whether they refer to general federal jurisdiction over territories or the more limited federal
jurisdiction over its lands. See, e.g., id. at 159–60 (quoting debates over Tennessee’s jurisdiction over federal
lands where the arguments are that granting Tennessee jurisdiction as a state does not necessarily give it
ownership over federal lands). Some quotes recognize that states have jurisdiction over federal lands as a default
matter, see, e.g., id. at 165 (quoting statements that under equal state sovereignty, western states can legislate
over federal lands with the same powers as eastern states)—which is consistent with a preemptive power for the
Property Clause, as preemption of state law only occurs with congressional legislation and preemption applies
equally to all states. There are some examples of statements in Congress that directly address broad preemptive
congressional powers and are inconsistent with other contemporary statements with significant weight, including
early Supreme Court case law. See, e.g., United States v. Gratiot, 39 U.S. 526, 538–39 (1840) (upholding the
lease of federal land within the borders of a state).
Congress can obtain exclusive jurisdiction over federal property under the Enclave Clause of Article I.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. Some commentators have argued that the existence of the Enclave Clause must
mean that federal power under the Property Clause does not preempt state power, at the risk of making the
Enclave Clause redundant. See Schmitt, Limiting the Property Clause, supra note 21; Patterson, supra note 21,
at 60; Engdahl, supra note 21, at 296; Hardwicke et al., supra note 21, at 418–20. That argument, however,
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Alternatively, some commentators have argued that the Clause involves
“proprietary” legislative powers that cannot support preemption. There is
substantial Supreme Court case law drawing on proprietorship as support for
congressional power under the Clause.179 But there is also case law (often
language in the same cases) stating that Congress has legislative or regulatory
power under the Clause in addition to its proprietary powers.180 The Court has
never endorsed the “proprietary/legislative” distinction as a reason to limit
congressional preemptive power under the Clause and has never clearly
separated the two powers either.
In addition, as laid out in Part II.A, any distinction between proprietary and
legislative powers for Property Clause purposes is in sharp tension with the
purpose of including the Property Clause in the Constitution, which was to
resolve jurisdictional (not just ownership) disputes over the western land
claims.181 Resolution of those land claims involved not only disputes over
overlooks the fact that federal power under the Enclave Clause is exclusive of any state power, while under the
Property Clause it is concurrent with state power, an important distinction. See Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 542–43; see
also Leshy, supra note 9, at 514–16 (noting this argument); Appel, supra note 21, at 4 n.15 (noting this
argument); Goble, supra note 21, at 500 (arguing that just because the Enclave Clause “completely preempts
state law” does not mean Article IV has “no preemptive power”). Of course, these default rules can be contracted
around by the state and federal government through agreements as to what powers the state will cede to the
federal government when the state consents to a federal enclave, through federal adoption of state laws in
governing an enclave or in federal use of blanket preemption on federal lands outside enclaves. See Schmitt,
Limiting the Property Clause, supra note 21, at 153–54 (noting this possibility and arguing that it means that the
distinction between concurrent and exclusive powers between the Property and Enclave Clauses is not relevant).
However, the default rules do matter because they set the terms by which negotiations or subsequent legislation
must occur. Thus, a Property Clause with preemptive power is not redundant with the Enclave Clause.
179
Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 525 (1897) (upholding federal law on ground that it prevented
government property from nuisances); United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 516 (1911) (upholding
delegation by Congress to land management agency because “an owner may delegate to his principal agent the
right to employ subordinates, giving to them a limited discretion”); Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 536
(1911) (“But ‘the nation is an owner, and has made Congress the principal agent to dispose of its property.’”).
180
Camfield, 167 U.S. at 525–26 (upholding congressional power to regulate private property adjoining
federal lands to protect federal lands while acknowledging that “[t]he general government doubtless has a power
over its own property analogous to the police power of the several States”); Grimaud, 220 U.S. at 516 (upholding
Forest Service regulations on the grounds that they are less significant than municipal ordinances); Kleppe, 426
U.S. at 536–37 (rejecting claims that Congress’s power is limited to making rules regarding the use and
protection of federal property); Schulenberg v. Harriman, 88 U.S. 44, 62 (1874) (holding that rules that apply to
private property transactions do not necessarily apply to federal land grants) (“A legislative grant operates as a
law as well as a transfer of the property, and has such force as the intent of the legislature requires.”).
181
See supra Part II.A; see also Gaetke, Refuting, supra note 21, at 624 n.50 (“The unlanded states feared
that the landed states would dominate the national government if they were permitted to create daughter states
in the western lands.”); Appel, supra note 21, at 21 (noting Maryland’s position that jurisdiction, not just title,
over western land claims should be ceded to the United States because of concerns that the new states would
otherwise be “loyal lackeys to their parents”); id. at 24–25 (noting that legislation adopted by the Continental
Congress gave Congress control over ceded western lands, effectively adopting the Maryland position); Goble,
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proprietorship, but also disputes over sovereignty. The federal government was
to be owner and sovereign of the ceded lands to ensure that those lands would
be formed into new states that were separate and independent from the existing
states. The federal government never simply played a role as landowner—as
demonstrated (if nothing else) by the role played by the federal government as
sovereign for the territories before admission as states.
Nor would this federal role as proprietor and neutral sovereign disappear
when the federal land is included within a newly admitted state. During the
1770s and 1780s, disputes over land ownership and sovereignty were necessarily
within existing states, as there were only states, not territories, at the time. For
instance, disputes over land ownership and sovereignty in the area that is now
Vermont included at least three claimants—New Hampshire, New York, and the
unrecognized state of Vermont—two of which were members of the Articles of
Confederation.182 A fight over land ownership and sovereignty occurred in the
Wyoming Valley within the borders of Pennsylvania between claimants under
Connecticut and Pennsylvania grants.183 Resolution of these disputes necessarily
involved the U.S. government,184 and a fear that these disputes might prompt

supra note 21, at 523 (arguing that in the debates in the 1780s over the western land claims, “the primary issue
was determining who would make the specific decisions” about how to manage those lands and noting “[t]he
compromise was the determination that the decision would be made on a federal, instead of a state basis.
Henceforth, the western lands would be held for the common good with no particular state’s citizens to be
preferred”). Appel makes the point most clearly:
[S]tate power over the lands ceded to the United States would have allowed the ceding states to
have more power than the states without such land claims. Collectively, the states could trust only
the United States to properly govern and serve as a neutral arbiter of the western lands. Therefore,
as first set forth in the constitutional convention, the United States was not merely a proprietor
over its property; it had the powers of a sovereign.
Appel, supra note 21, at 29–30.
182
For a thorough history of the jurisdictional conflicts over what became Vermont between New York,
New Hampshire, and those who sought to create a separate state of Vermont, see ONUF, ORIGINS, supra note 71,
103–48.
183
See id. at 49–75 (providing an overview of the dispute); id. at 8–11 (noting how Connecticut in 1775
sent armed troops into Pennsylvania to enforce its claims to be able to grant lands in the Wyoming Valley, and
how Connecticut settlers defied Pennsylvania state authority). The legal aspects of the Wyoming dispute were
resolved by a trial set up under the Articles in 1781, though conflict on the ground continued afterwards. Id. at
19–20, 58–59. A similar dispute existed between Virginian settlers in southwestern Pennsylvania and the
Pennsylvania government, which was resolved by an agreement between Virginia and Pennsylvania in 1779. Id.
at 49–74.
184
A trial under the Articles resolved the Wyoming dispute. Negotiation facilitated by Congress between
New York and Vermont, and congressional recognition of Vermont as a state, resolved the Vermont dispute;
observers also noted that any alternative that did not recognize Vermont would require either the use of force by
the Continental Congress to subdue the Vermonters, or the possibility of combined military action by New York
and New Hampshire against the Vermonters, raising the specter of interstate conflict. Id. at 114–15, 123.

BIBER_2.16.22

2022]

2/16/2022 3:02 PM

THE PROPERTY CLAUSE

785

interstate conflict and dissolution of the United States was a major motivator for
the Constitution.185
This history leads to another reason why the preemptive power of federal
legislation with respect to federal land under the Property Clause would not end
even after the admission of a state. The dispute over the western land claims was
also a claim by the landless states that those western lands reflected the shared
sacrifice of all the colonies that had fought for independence. The decision to
transfer ownership and sovereignty of those lands to the federal government can
be understood as a victory for that perspective—that the federal government was
the repository of the lands on behalf of the states.
This language identifying the United States as a trustee for the states (and,
more broadly, for the people as a whole) in its ownership of those public lands
has a long and rich history in American law and politics. The Supreme Court has
drawn on this language regularly in its case law upholding federal power over
the public lands.186 For instance, in Camfield v. United States, the Court upheld
the application of a federal law beyond the property border to private land
adjoining the federal lands.187 The Court rejected arguments that this would
improperly undermine state sovereignty because the federal government
required the power to protect its lands against states, including the state where
the land was located, in order to protect the interests of the broader American
public: “A different rule would place the public domain of the United States
completely at the mercy of state legislatures.”188 If the United States did not
exercise this power to protect its lands, then it “would be recreant to its duties as
trustee for the people of the United States to permit any individual or private
corporation to monopolize them for private gain.”189
C. Equal Footing and Equal Sovereignty
The last question is whether the power of Congress with respect to federal
lands should be limited within states because it would undermine the sovereignty

185
Hamilton drew on the conflict over the Wyoming Valley and Vermont as a reason for ratification of
the Constitution. THE FEDERALIST NO. 7, at 60, 61–62 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961); see
also ONUF, ORIGINS, supra note 71, at 149–53 (noting the role that these disputes played in motivating a sense
of “political crisis” in the lead up to the Constitutional Convention); id. at 154 (“Most Americans agreed that the
solution to ‘competitions and encroachments’ among the states, ‘whether in commerce or territory,’ was to
strengthen the central government.”).
186
See supra note 120.
187
167 U.S. 518, 528 (1897).
188
Id. at 526.
189
Id. at 524.
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of those states in violation of the equal footing doctrine. 190 The implication of
the equal footing argument is that after admission of a state either congressional
power must be limited or public lands should be divested from the federal
government.191 The argument sometimes builds off a claim that the “dispose”
language of the Property Clause creates a mandatory duty for the federal
government to divest itself of its ownership interests when a state is admitted to
the Union.192
But divestment of federal land ownership in admitted states would in fact
contradict the role that the federal government is supposed to play under a
horizontal federalism understanding of the Property Clause. In addition, a
horizontal federalism understanding of the Property Clause does not restrict
congressional power to impose differential requirements on states once they
have been admitted to the Union. As noted above, the equal footing doctrine was
rejected as a textual matter by the Constitutional Convention.193 A weak version
190
See, e.g., Engdahl, supra note 21, at 294; Hardwicke et al., supra note 21, at 419, 431 (stating that “the
framers did not intend that the Federal Government should become a proprietor of revenue-bearing lands within
the states” and calling such ownership a “constitutional monstrosity” that undermines state sovereignty).
191
See, e.g, Patterson, supra note 21, at 47–48; Hardwicke et al., supra note 21, at 419. In the political
arena, these arguments were the basis of the Sagebrush Rebellion of the 1980s, the County Supremacy movement
of the 1990s, and the Land Transfer movement of the 2010s, all of which called for transfer of some or all federal
land to state or local control. For an overview of these movements, see Leshy, supra note 9. For the equal footing
arguments made by counsel for Utah as part of its land transfer claims in the 2010s, see HOWARD ET AL., supra
note 8, at 55–99.
The equal footing arguments can be seen as the foundation for all criticisms of preemptive federal
power under the Property Clause. See Leshy, supra note 9, at 507; Goble, supra note 21, at 497 (“[T]he classic
doctrine thus resolves into an equal footing argument.”). One scholar has explicitly argued that the federal
government can retain property ownership within states without having preemptive power. Schmitt, Limiting the
Property Clause, supra note 21.
192
See, e.g., Natelson, supra note 21, at 350, 363–65. Utah’s claims to ownership of federal lands within
its borders relied in part on claims that the Enabling Act admitting Utah to the Union constituted a promise that
federal lands within Utah would eventually be sold or given away. KOCHAN, A LEGAL OVERVIEW, supra note 8,
at 12–16; HOWARD ET AL., supra note 8, at 99–113; Kochan, “Duty to Dispose,” supra note 8, at 1150–67. The
statutory interpretation claims based on the Utah Enabling Act are thoroughly rebutted elsewhere. See Leshy,
supra note 9, at 553–58. These statutory interpretation arguments require rejecting interpretations of the Clause
that give broad power to the federal and government. Kochan, “Duty to Dispose,” supra note 8, at 1167. They
are also closely related to claims that there is an obligation for the federal government to dispose of its lands
within admitted states because the purpose of the cession of lands to the federal government by the landed
original states in the 1780s and 1790s was to advance the creation of new states. See KOCHAN, A LEGAL
OVERVIEW, supra note 8, at 17–18, 24–27 (relying on a claim about historical expectations around the land
cessions to support Utah’s position, and also noting that the equal footing theory both supports the statutory
interpretation claim as well as providing an additional argument); HOWARD ET AL., supra note 8, at 99–113
(arguing the same); Kochan, “Duty to Dispose,” supra note 8, at 1160–67, 1182–88 (arguing the same). As
discussed earlier, while the land cessions were intended to advance the creation of new states, they were also
intended to advance the role of the federal government as a neutral arbiter among states in managing the lands,
including after states were admitted to the Union.
193
See supra Part II.A.
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of equal footing focused on political rights would be consistent with a horizontal
federalism conception of Article IV, but a broad version is not required by the
text, the historical context of the Property and Admission Clauses, or a
horizontal federalism conception of Article IV. As such, the equal footing theory
neither provides an argument against preemption of state law under the Property
Clause nor requires divestiture of federal land holdings within states.
First, the text of the Property Clause cuts against divestiture. As noted in the
prior section, the text grants Congress the power to both dispose and enact
needful rules and regulations.194 Implicit divestiture of public lands to newly
admitted states—where the congressional acts admitting the new states
explicitly required those states to disclaim any claims to those federal lands195—
would be deeply inconsistent with congressional supremacy under the Clause.
Second, the historical context for the Property and Admission Clauses
outlined in Part II.A makes clear that the purpose of the Property Clause was to
grant the federal government the authority to manage and exercise sovereignty
over the public lands, creating a strong federal role to mediate between the
conflicts among the states over the western land claims. As developed in the
prior section, the federal government was needed as a neutral arbiter for the
public lands even after the admission of the states, both to resolve conflicts and
as the owner or trustee of the lands for the other states.196 Divestiture of federal
lands within new states would hinder the role that the federal government could
play in managing and controlling the lands on behalf of all states to mediate the
potential for conflict between the states over those lands. The mediating role of
the federal government is important regardless of whether the federal public
lands are within a territory or a state—contestation over land grants existed even
within the original thirteen states.197 And without preemption, federal power as
mediator and manager of the lands could be undermined by a hostile state
government.198
Likewise, divestiture would benefit a newly admitted state at the expense of
the other states that had contributed to and supported the efforts to acquire those
lands, undermining the federal government’s role as trustee for all the states.

194

See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
Biber, supra note 75, at 130–31 tbl.1.
196
See supra Part III.B.
197
See supra notes 182–85 and accompanying text.
198
See Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 526 (1897) (“A different rule would place the public
domain of the United States completely at the mercy of state legislation.”).
195
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Divestiture would end that mediating role. John Leshy has previously articulated
the point:
[T]here is no credible evidence that the founders intended to put the
national government under any legal obligation to divest itself of
ownership of all the public lands, whether to new states or anyone else.
Indeed, such an objective would have made no sense to the politically
savvy founders. There is no question that they, and the states they
hailed from, regarded these lands as being bought with their “blood
and treasure,” and they expected these lands to be used for the
“common benefit” of the entire nation. Thus, they were very unlikely
to support relinquishing all control over them to new states.199

Leshy also notes the long history of federal retention of lands within admitted
states from the establishment of the United States to achieve a range of
purposes.200
At the heart of most of the arguments for divestiture is a claim that the equal
footing doctrine requires divestiture. Despite the rejection of an explicit equal
footing requirement at the Constitutional Convention, the Supreme Court has
articulated an equal footing doctrine—though that doctrine, as described in Part
I, has been limited to a very specific range of issues, including ownership of
submerged lands on the date of statehood and the location of a state’s capital.201
None of the leading equal footing cases involve the management or divestment
of terrestrial public lands.202
199
Leshy, supra note 9, at 511; see Goble, supra note 21, at 506 (“The [argument for divestiture] confuses
factual equality (the presence or absence of federal lands) with political equality (the authority of the states over
article IV lands). So long as all states have the same authority over article IV lands within their borders, the
equal footing doctrine is not offended.”); Gaetke, Refuting, supra note 21, at 643.
200
See Leshy, supra note 9, at 518–19. Leshy also notes that arguments that federal lands should be
divested to newly admitted western states was broadly rejected in the first half of the eighteenth century,
including by James Madison. Id. at 523–27. Given the public debates and the settled understanding, one can
plausibly conclude that the constitutional question has been settled. William Baude, Constitutional Liquidation,
71 STAN. L. REV. 1, 13–21 (2019).
201
Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 579 (1911); Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 230 (1845).
202
See Coyle, 221 U.S. at 562 (discussing the location of the state capital); Shelby County v. Holder, 570
U.S. 529, 534–35 (2013) (discussing the Voting Rights Act). The Supreme Court has held that the equal footing
doctrine requires transfer to a state upon its admission ownership of lands submerged between navigable waters
at the time of admission. Pollard, 44 U.S. at 230. The Court has explicitly rejected extending that reasoning to
dry land. Scott v. Lattig, 227 U.S. 229, 244 (1913); Texas v. Louisiana, 410 U.S. 702, 713 (1973); Arizona v.
California, 373 U.S. 546, 597–98 (1963). The importance of navigation on waterways in a pre-industrial
economy provides a strong basis for special treatment of lands submerged under navigable waterways. For
scholars analyzing the case law and concluding that it does not require divestiture of federal lands within state
borders, see, e.g., Leshy, supra note 9, at 560–61; Leah M. Litman, Inventing Equal Sovereignty, 114 MICH. L.
REV. 1207, 1216–18 (2016). For case law rejecting equal footing challenges to federal land retention, see, e.g.,
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How does a horizontal federalism understanding of Article IV shape our
understanding of the equal footing doctrine?203 On the one hand, to the extent
Article IV is understood to emphasize an agreement among the states at the
Constitutional Convention as to how to manage interstate relations between the
existing states, Article IV could support a rejection of the equal footing doctrine
as not grounded in the text of the Constitution. This is a vision of Article IV as
an agreement between the existing states at the expense of new states, the vision
of delegates such as Governour Morris.204
On the other hand, to the extent Article IV is better understood as a
horizontal federalism agreement among all the states—present and future—
rather than an extra-textual equal footing doctrine makes more sense. A key
driver for the development of the Constitution was the resolution of western land
claims in a way that was equitable among the landed and landless states, and in
a way that would also ensure western settlers were loyal to the United States. An
equal footing doctrine would have reduced the risk that some new states would
be subservient to some or all the existing states, and equally situated new states
would be more likely to inspire loyalty by future settlers. Given the drafting
history and historical context of Article IV,205 some notion of an equal footing
doctrine seems plausible as the alternative, despite the explicit rejection of the
provision in the Convention. In addition, the equality principle for states in the
Senate (entrenched in Article V) would support an equal footing doctrine, albeit
perhaps a narrow one focused on political rights.206 Finally, the Northwest
Ordinance, enacted in 1787 as the Constitution Convention was just convening
and which provided for governance and eventual statehood of the federal
territories northwest of the Ohio River, guaranteed equal footing for states

Stearns v. Minnesota, 179 U.S. 223, 242–45 (1900) (upholding conditional land grants to states); United States
v. Gardner, 107 F.3d 1314, 1318–19 (9th Cir. 1997).
203
It is important to keep in mind the distinction between the separation-of-powers and federalism
implications of a horizontal federalism understanding of Article IV for the Property Clause. The separation-ofpowers implication of horizontal federalism emphasizes the primacy of Congress in implementing the Clause,
since Congress is a representative of the states. That is distinct, however, from the power of the federal
government vis-à-vis states. Congress, even as a representative of the states, is still a component of the federal
government. Thus, it is entirely consistent to recognize the primacy of Congress under horizontal federalism
while still recognizing a robust federal role under the Clause vis-à-vis the states.
204
See supra notes 83–85 and accompanying text.
205
See supra Parts II.A & II.B.
206
See Zachary Price, NAMUDNO’s Non-Existent Principle of State Equality, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE
24, 27–28 (2014) (noting these provisions); Litman, supra note 202, at 1230. The existence of specific provisions
of the Constitution that mandate state equality might also be taken to imply that other forms of inequality are
not prohibited by the Constitution. Leshy, supra note 9, at 510; Litman, supra note 202, at 1230–32.
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admitted pursuant to its provisions—the framers of the Constitution were surely
aware of the Ordinance, and the first Congress quickly reenacted it.207
But much of the evidence for an equal footing doctrine also supports a
narrow version of the doctrine—one focused on political rights and sovereignty
rather than a broader vision of economic equality. This latter, broader vision is
the basis for the claim that federal land ownership within states (which is heavily
concentrated in the western United States) is unequal because it diminishes the
power of states with large concentrations of federal land ownership. However,
while the Northwest Ordinance guaranteed equal footing for newly admitted
states, it also required those states to abide by a range of restrictive conditions—
including the protection of religious liberty, the prohibition of slavery, and a
disclaimer of ownership or taxation power over federal lands within their
borders.208 Almost every congressional statute admitting a new state has
required that state to disclaim ownership of federal lands, respect federal power
over relations with Indian tribes, and abide by a range of additional intrusive
conditions.209 This history weighs in favor of limiting any equal footing doctrine
to political sovereignty, consistent with existing case law applying the
doctrine.210 Thus, the Supreme Court has rejected claims that “Congress cannot

207
An Ordinance for the Government of the Territory of the United States North West of the River Ohio,
supra note 76, at 342; An Act to Provide for the Government of the Territory Northwest of the River Ohio, art.
V, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50, 53 (1789). The Court has drawn on the Northwest Ordinance as evidence of the intent of the
framers. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 573 (1964) (citing the Ordinance as example of the framers
requiring territorial legislatures to be apportioned equally by population, and that equal apportionment is
therefore mandated by the equal protection clause). For scholars drawing on the Ordinance to advance versions
of an equal footing or equal sovereignty doctrine, see Thomas B. Colby, In Defense of the Equal Sovereignty
Principle, 65 DUKE L.J. 1087, 1104–05 (2016) (citing equal footing language in most state admission acts);
Landever, supra note 21, at 563.
208
An Ordinance for the Government of the Territory of the United States North West of the River Ohio,
supra note 76, at 340–43; see also Leshy, supra note 9, at 508–09 (stating the Ordinance’s “understanding of
‘equality’ in its reference to ‘equal footing’ was ‘narrowly defined.’ It referred to political status, and not to other
subjects like economic or resource equality, or equality as respects U.S. landholdings”); Goble, supra note 21,
at 506 n.46 (noting that the equal footing language in Ordinance “seems limited to political instead of economic
equality. [A] view . . . supported by other provisions of the clause that forbid new states from interfering with
the disposition of federal land”); Litman, supra note 202, at 1235–36 (making similar points including Ordinance
restriction on new states being able to allow slavery or religious discrimination).
209
Biber, supra note 75, at 130–31 tbl.1.
210
The Supreme Court stated the following in United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950):

The “equal footing” clause has long been held to refer to political rights and to sovereignty. It
does not, of course, include economic stature or standing. There has never been equality among
the States in that sense. Some States when they entered the Union had within their boundaries
tracts of land belonging to the Federal Government; others were sovereigns of their soil.
Id. at 716 (citations omitted); see also United States v. Gardner, 107 F.3d 1314, 1319 (9th Cir. 1997) (making a
similar point).
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constitutionally withdraw large bodies of land from settlement without the
consent of the state where it is located” and stated that the United States can
“withhold or reserve the land . . . indefinitely.”211
Nor would this narrow notion of the equal footing doctrine support
restricting the preemptive power of the federal government under the Property
Clause. Federal preemptive power over federal lands does not alter the ability of
a state to enact its own laws that apply on non-federal lands, which is in many
ways the core feature of state sovereignty. And while states with more federal
lands within their borders have more lands that are covered by the potential
preemptive power of the Property Clause, that inequality is replicated in a whole
host of substantive areas where federal power is present. As noted by other
scholars, the fact that New York is a center for the financial industry, such that
federal securities regulation has a heavier preemptive effect in that state, is not
a violation of the equal footing doctrine.212 Similarly, the fact that a coastal state
has a greater interaction with federally-managed waters and submerged lands is
not a violation of the equal footing doctrine.213
A separate question is the extent to which the equal footing doctrine should
be expanded into an equal sovereignty doctrine, as articulated by the Supreme
Court in Shelby County v. Holder.214 The equal footing case law before Shelby
County had exclusively focused on the ability of Congress to use admissions
conditions to constrain state decision-making after admission of the state.215
Shelby County extended that case law to laws passed under other congressional
power besides the Admissions Clause, legislation applicable to currently
admitted states.216 The Court overturned a provision of the Voting Rights Act
that required preapproval of changes to voting laws in certain states on the
grounds that the law improperly undermined the equal sovereignty of those
states.217
Again, a horizontal federalism understanding of Article IV could be
understood as supporting this extension to an equal sovereignty doctrine. One
211

Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 535–36 (1911).
Leshy, supra note 9, at 564.
213
See Goble, supra note 21, at 506–07. For a contrary, broad, and unsupportable claim as to the scope of
the equal footing doctrine, see HOWARD ET AL., supra note 8, at 77 (“The Equal Footing Doctrine requires that
each State be admitted on an equal footing with the original thirteen in every way.”).
214
Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 544 (2013). Legal counsel for Utah has argued that the equal
sovereignty doctrine also supports divestiture of federal lands to admitted states, though the argument is
essentially the same as an equal footing claim. HOWARD ET AL., supra note 8, at 55–72.
215
See Biber, supra note 75, at 175–84.
216
Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 545–50.
217
Id. at 544–45.
212
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could build on the debates during the drafting and ratification of the Constitution
about the need to ensure that western states would not be subordinate to the
original states and argue this history implies that the original states (and so all
states, newly admitted or not) should be treated as equals.218 However, the
horizontal federalism of Article IV also recognizes the role of Congress as the
representative of states and the ability of states to use their equal representation
in the Senate to protect their interests.219
Territories or other entities seeking admission by Congress—a decision
purely in the discretion of the states currently in the Union—do not have the
protection of congressional representation available to them. To protect these
more vulnerable entities, an equal footing doctrine prevents Congress from using
its Admissions Clause powers to extend congressional powers beyond what
Congress has vis-à-vis current states. Indeed, all the existing equal footing cases
can be understood as limiting the power of Congress to leverage its Admissions
Clause to impose permanent constraints on the political power of new states.220
For instance, Coyle v. Smith221 involved an admissions act that constrained a
state’s ability to move its capital, which the Court held was an “essential and
peculiarly state power[]”222—a power that would not otherwise be within
Congress’s control. Bolln v. Nebraska223 rejected an argument that a state
enabling act provision required the state to adopt the Bill of Rights into the state
constitution because Congress had no power to require any state to incorporate
the Bill of Rights.
Finally, there are cases that have held that admissions act provisions that
required newly admitted states to keep navigable waterways as “common
highways and forever free” without any tax did not prevent states from
218
The state-to-state relationships implicit in the horizontal federalism of Article IV could be analogized
to international law, which some scholars have argued implies equality among the states. Colby, supra note 207,
at 1139–40. However, international legal scholars influential in the Founding period, such as Vattel, emphasized
the possibility of sovereign states with greatly variable levels of power and sovereignty vis-à-vis each other,
even if they had formal equality in the international legal system. See Seth Davis, Eric Biber & Elena Kempf,
Persisting Sovereignties, U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) (on file with author) (describing the concept of
dependent sovereignty in international law); see also Litman, supra note 202, at 1240–41 (noting the issue).
219
Price, supra note 206, at 27 (“While it is conceivable that a majority of states in Congress could
routinely gang up on a single state or a minority group of states, the Constitution provides states with substantial
means of political self-defense.”); Litman, supra note 202, at 1265–66.
220
See Litman, supra note 202, at 1211, 1220–21, 1225–28 (stating that state admissions cases use equal
sovereignty to develop two limits on Congress’s power to admit states: “(1) Congress may only impose laws . . .
that fall within its delegated powers, and (2) Congress may not enact laws . . . that interfere with spheres in which
the states are sovereign or autonomous”).
221
221 U.S. 559 (1911).
222
Id. at 565.
223
176 U.S. 83, 87–88, 90–91 (1900).
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constructing bridges that obstructed free navigation where there was no separate
congressional law prohibiting bridge construction.224 Some of these cases
analyze the relevant admission act language narrowly,225 while others use
broader language about state equality.226 However, they all build on a nineteenth
century principle of constitutional law that states had primary authority over
bridge and canal construction unless Congress acted as a default standard of
constitutional power. As such, the Court can be perceived as reluctant to
conclude that Congress used its admissions power to leverage a permanent
restriction on one state’s authority in bridge and canal construction, rather than
finding Congress unable to restrict a state’s authority relative to other states.227
A broader version of the equal footing or equal sovereignty doctrine that
expands beyond restricting congressional leverage of Admissions Clause
powers is, therefore, neither required by a horizontal federalism understanding
of Article IV nor supported by the relevant case law.228
IV. EXTENSIONS
The analysis in this Article has focused on how a horizontal federalism
understanding of Article IV can shape our interpretation and application of the
Property Clause. But there are additional interpretive problems specific to the
Property Clause that a horizontal federalism understanding of Article IV might
help resolve. This Part tentatively addresses two: (1) the application of the
Appointments Clause to federal officials under Article IV, and (2) the power of
Congress to use non-Article III courts to resolve disputes under Article IV. In
both situations, a horizontal federalism understanding of Article IV indicates
that Congress may have greater powers to structure both the Executive and
Judicial Branches in the context of Article IV than it might have otherwise.
224
Colby, supra note 207, at 1106–08, 1113–14, 1118–22 (citation omitted) (the leading scholarly article
on the topic). For the case law on the topic, see generally Escanaba v. City of Chicago, 107 U.S. 678 (1883);
Withers v. Buckley, 61 U.S. 84 (1857); Cardwell v. Am. River Bridge Co., 113 U.S. 205 (1885); Willamette Iron
Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 125 U.S. 1 (1888).
225
See, e.g., Cardwell, 113 U.S. at 212.
226
See, e.g., Escanaba, 107 U.S. at 688–89.
227
Language in some of the case law can be understood broadly, with strong wording about the essential
nature of equality across all states. Colby, supra note 207, at 1106–08, 1113–14, 1118–22. A horizontal
federalism version of Article IV would be skeptical of this broad interpretation of the case law.
228
Contra HOWARD ET AL., supra note 8, at 122–23 (arguing that the placement of the Property Clause in
Article IV implies that Congress has limited powers under the Clause and that there cannot be long-term federal
land ownership under the Clause within an admitted state). As noted above, while a horizontal federalism
understanding of Article IV might emphasize congressional power vis-à-vis the Executive, it does not minimize
federal power where it is granted by the text. Indeed, a horizontal federalism conception of Article would
emphasize the power that Congress has as representative of the states.
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A. The Appointments Clause
The question of how the Appointments Clause applies to federal officials
exercising Article IV powers recently arose in the Supreme Court’s
consideration of a challenge to the composition of the fiscal review board that
Congress created to address the Puerto Rican debt crisis.229 The board was
composed of members appointed by the President without Senate confirmation,
in tension with the Appointments Clause requirement that “Officers of the
United States” be presidentially nominated and Senate confirmed. Because
Puerto Rico is a territory rather than a state, Congress can exercise broad powers
with respect to Puerto Rico under the Property Clause.230 The Court upheld the
method of appointing members of the fiscal review board on the grounds that
the Appointments Clause does not apply to territorial officials who deal
primarily with “local” issues, as opposed to “national” issues. The Court
reasoned that even though the Appointments Clause does apply to Article IV,
Article IV officials who address “local” issues are not officers of the United
States who require presidential appointment and Senate confirmation.231 Instead,
they constitute “inferior Officers” who can be appointed solely by the President,
as provided for by the Appointments Clause.
Here, the Court perhaps reached the right result through incorrect reasoning.
As Justice Thomas noted in his concurrence, the border between “local” and
“national” is not based in any text of the Constitution, nor is it one that is easily
applied in the context of federal lands or territories.232 For instance, the fiscal
review board was authorized to participate in bankruptcy proceedings in federal
court, arguably a “national” question. The better approach, as Justice Thomas
noted, may be to recognize that Article IV provides a different framework for
considering these kinds of structural questions and authorizes different
approaches to appointment of territorial officials.233
229

Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R. v. Aurelius Inv., 140 S. Ct. 1649 (2020).
See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (“The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful
Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States.”).
231
Fin. Oversight Bd., 140 S. Ct. at 1651.
232
See id. at 1671 (Thomas, J., concurring). The Court noted, in considering a case about the relative
powers of the U.S. Attorney General (appointed by the President) as opposed to the Territorial Attorney General
(appointed by the territorial governor), that “[s]trictly speaking, there is no sovereignty in a Territory of the
United States but that of the United States itself. Crimes committed therein are committed against the
government and dignity of the United States.” Snow v. United States, 85 U.S. 317, 321 (1873).
233
Fin. Oversight Bd., 140 S. Ct. at 1671 (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting that the key question is whether
Board “perform[s] ongoing statutory duties under only Article IV”). Thomas’s opinion is ambiguous as to
whether he would limit his principle simply to officials acting under the Property Clause governing territories
or to officials acting under any Article IV power. Giving Congress this kind of leeway will not necessarily result
230
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Recognizing a different framework for territorial governance is all the more
important because the workaround developed by the Court in the Puerto Rican
fiscal review board case—categorizing territorial officials as “inferior Officers”
who do not require Senate confirmation—still leaves fundamental constitutional
problems for the management of territories. Self-governing U.S. territories have
territorial officials who are elected by the voters of those territories—members
of territorial legislatures and governors.234 Even if these officials are considered
“inferior Officers,” the Constitution only allows them to be appointed by the
President, the courts, or the “Heads of Departments.”235 None of those categories
cover elected officials. Thus, application of the Appointments Clause to
territorial elected officials might wipe out self-governance for the territories.236
Such a result is not just normatively undesirable—it is also inconsistent with
long historical practice. The Northwest Ordinance provided for election of
territorial legislatures once certain population thresholds had been met.237 The
framers were very aware of the Northwest Ordinance at the time of the framing
and reenacted it quickly after adoption of the Constitution—including the
provisions for elected territorial legislatures.238 Congress repeatedly continued
to provide for elected territorial legislatures over the history of territorial
governance in the United States, and generally expanded the powers of these
legislatures over time.239
A horizontal federalism understanding of Article IV—one that emphasizes
congressional power to control governance relationships in federal territories
and public lands—would similarly support such self-governance arrangements,
in legislative aggrandizement at the expense of the President—in the PROMESA case, the fiscal review board
was appointed by the President without Senate approval. Id. at 1654.
234
See LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 22, at 132–33; JACK ERICSON EBLEN, THE FIRST AND SECOND
UNITED STATES EMPIRES: GOVERNORS AND TERRITORIAL GOVERNMENT 1784-1912, at 157–58, 166–69 (1968).
235
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
236
For scholars noting this potential outcome and attempting to articulate work-around mechanisms that
would allow for territorial elected officials and legislatures consistent with the Appointments Clause, see
LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 22, at 133–38.
237
See Ordinance for the Government of the Territory of the United States North West of the River Ohio,
supra note 76, at 335–38.
238
An Act to Provide for the Government of the Territory Northwest of the River Ohio, art. V, ch. 8, 1
Stat. 50, 53 (1789); see also Fin. Oversight Bd., 140 S. Ct. at 1668–69 (Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasizing
this history and the importance of the reenactment of the Northwest Ordinance by the First Congress).
239
See Clinton v. Englebrecht, 80 U.S. 434, 441 (1871) (providing an overview of the history); Onuf,
Territories and Statehood, supra note 71, at 1290–92 (noting how Congress provided for increasing selfgovernment in territories as European-American population increased); EBLEN, supra note 234, at 52–86, 138–
170; id. at 205 (noting an increased dominance of territorial legislatures with respect to governors as the
nineteenth century proceeded). Early in the history of the territories, “[g]ubernatorial rule proved to be
ideologically suspect and administratively disastrous.” Onuf, Territories and Statehood, supra note 71, at 1297.
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should Congress seek to pursue them. Due to congressional primacy in Article
IV, Congress has leeway to manage and govern the territories and public lands
as the representative of the states. This leeway exists even if such governance
requires alternative appointment mechanisms other than those identified in the
Appointments Clause.
B. The Courts
Similarly, congressional primacy in the context of Article IV would support
giving Congress greater leeway in determining the structure of the courts in the
context of territories and federal public lands, and even authorize alternative
methods dispute resolution beyond Article III courts. Again, this is consistent
with historical practice.
In the context of territorial governments, the Supreme Court has long upheld
the use of non-Article III courts where judges are appointed by territorial
governors without Senate confirmation or lifetime tenure—including the
resolution of disputes that might otherwise be heard by an Article III court.240
While the Court has given various justifications for this approach—including
the temporary nature of territorial governments requiring flexibility in
staffing,241 the fact that Congress stands in the shoes of a state government with
respect to territories,242 and unspecified “practical considerations”243—this
congressional power over the courts is consistent with a horizontal federalism
perspective of congressional primacy in Article IV.
Likewise, in the context of structuring dispute resolution with respect to
federal public lands, as with territories, the courts have upheld the use of nonArticle III courts to resolve disputes over land ownership or claims of who

240
See, e.g., Am. Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 26 U.S. 511, 546 (1828); Benner v. Porter, 50 U.S. 235,
245 (1850) (holding that territorial courts need not be Article III courts, but once a territory is admitted as a state,
its federal courts must be organized under Article III); Gov’t of the Canal Zone v. Scott, 502 F.2d 566, 570–71
(5th Cir. 1974); O’Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 535 (1933); Balzac v. People of Porto Rico, 258
U.S. 298, 312 (1922); Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 458–59 (1929); N. Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon
Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 64 (1982); see also STORY, supra note 71, at 597 (§ 1325); LAWSON & SEIDMAN,
supra note 22, at 146–50 (noting case law and its current relevance, and arguing the case law is wrongly decided);
cf. Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 419–20 (1973) (upholding non-Article III courts in Washington,
D.C. under the District Clause, art. I, § 8, cl. 17, and explicitly connecting them to congressional power under
the Property Clause). For the proposition that these courts can hear cases within the scope of Article III, see
Clinton, 80 U.S. at 447; Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 545 (1962).
241
O’Donoghue, 289 U.S. at 536 (“A sufficient foundation for these decisions in respect of the territorial
courts is to be found in the transitory character of the territorial governments.”); Glidden, 370 U.S. at 545–46.
242
N. Pipeline Const., 458 U.S. at 64.
243
Palmore, 411 U.S. at 403–04.
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should receive federal public lands.244 Congress has delegated this work on
occasion to agencies, territorial governors, specially convened commissions, and
non-Article III territorial courts.245
Congressional power under Article IV over dispute resolution does not,
however, mean that there is no role for courts—at least, so long as Congress has
provided for judicial review.246 It is true that in the first half of the nineteenth
century, federal courts took a very hands-off approach to lawsuits against
executive officials who implemented the public lands laws,247 but this is not due
to any reluctance by courts to hear claims in the public lands context,
specifically. Instead, it reflects congressional statutes that did not explicitly
allow for judicial review of agency decisions, nineteenth century limitations on
the remedies available in lawsuits against the government, and the opportunity
for dissatisfied parties to seek relief through Congress, which often passed
legislation to resolve disputes between claimants and the federal government.248
244
See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 107 F.2d 402, 409–10 (9th Cir. 1939); Grisar v.
McDowell, 73 U.S. 363, 379 (1867); Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 284
(1855); Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553, 565 (1933).
245
See GREGORY ABLAVSKY, FEDERAL GROUND: GOVERNING PROPERTY AND VIOLENCE IN THE FIRST
U.S. TERRITORIES 203 (Paul Brand et al. eds., 2021) (noting the use of commissions to resolve land claims
disputes in the early republic); LESHY, supra note 71, at 31–40; id. at 62–72 (noting a commission created by
Congress to resolve lead land lease claims in Missouri); MASHAW, supra note 110, at 88 (noting that in 1829
there was “a system of administrative land claims commissioners whose adjudicatory output rivaled that of the
judiciary”); id. at 123 (stating the creation of administrative processes in the 1790s was a response to the
conclusion that “territorial courts could not make decisions on all of these [foreign land] claims”); id. at 128–29
(describing overall history); id. at 254–56 (noting large scale administrative review in public land context in late
nineteenth century); WHITE, supra note 131, at 516–18 (noting the large administrative process for adjudicating
land claims in early nineteenth century, with broad discretion given to the agencies); ROHRBOUGH, supra note
29, at 33–36 (noting that in 1803 Republicans started to create a Board of Commissions to resolve foreign and
other title claims in Louisiana and other territories).
246
U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. In addition, other provisions of the Constitution, such as the Due Process
Clause under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, might require judicial review of certain kinds of disputes.
247
MASHAW, supra note 110, at 245; Ann Woolhandler, Judicial Deference to Administrative Action—A
Revisionist History, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 197, 216–17 (1991). Ann Woolhandler argues that in the public lands
context, this was driven in part by a desire to avoid undermining reliance interests and stability in land title. Id.
at 234 (“The Court’s deference to long-standing constructions of statutes by the executive seems to have been
similarly influenced by the need for reliability in land patents to avoid obstructions on the sale and use of land.”);
see also Wright v. Rosenberry, 121 U.S. 488, 500–01 (1887) (rejecting challenges to factual decisions by the
land office and noting that the patent granting land should be “conclusive as against any collateral attacks[,] . . .
an invaluable muniment of title, and a source of quiet and peace to its possessor”).
248
MASHAW, supra note 110, at 136–37; Woolhandler, supra note 247, at 235, 235 n.192 (noting the lack
of explicit statutory review provisions in land patent statutes may have encouraged less searching judicial review
in that context, compared to invention patents where the statutes did have review provisions); see also United
States v. Arredondo, 31 U.S. 691, 711, 729 (1832) (denying to hear dispute over a Spanish land grant because
Congress had not provided for judicial review); Astiazaran v. Santa Rita Land & Mining Co., 148 U.S. 80, 81–
82 (1893) (“[T]he duty of providing the mode of securing these rights and of fulfilling the obligations imposed
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Indeed, once courts took different attitudes towards the possibility of relief
against the federal government, courts began to seriously review agency
interpretations of public lands statutes and overturned those interpretations
where they were unwarranted.249
Accordingly, while others have argued that there is no room for judicial
review of executive branch implementation of Property Clause powers because
of the “proprietary” nature of the clause,250 such arguments are inconsistent with
historical practice and undermine the horizontal federalism of Article IV by
preventing Congress from establishing enforcement mechanisms for executive
compliance with congressional enactments
CONCLUSION
Article IV can be understood as an important Article on its own in our
constitutional structure—one focused on horizontal federalism or building stateto-state relationships to create a stronger Union. This understanding of Article
IV helps resolve thorny disputes over the Property Clause, perhaps the most
important Clause within the Article. It more clearly delineates the border
between congressional and executive power in implementing the Clause,

upon the United States by the treaties belonged to the political department of the government; and congress
might either itself discharge that duty, or delegate it to the judicial department.”).
249
See Woolhandler, supra note 247, at 219–20 (describing the expansion of judicial review of public land
decisions); see also Wright, 121 U.S. at 519–20 (holding that jurisdictional challenges to land office decisions
can include claims that the land office had no power to transfer property to an adverse claimant). For examples
of judicial rejection of agency legal interpretations in the public lands context, see Lindsey v. Hawes, 67 U.S.
554, 562–63 (1862); United States v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 148 U.S. 562, 569 (1893); Dubuque & Pac. R.R. Co.
v. Litchfield, 64 U.S. 66, 89 (1859); Hewitt v. Schultz, 180 U.S. 139, 156 (1901) (“Of course, if the ruling of [the
land office] was plainly erroneous, it would be the duty of the court to give effect to the will of Congress . . . .”);
Burfenning v. Chi., St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha Ry. Co., 163 U.S. 321, 323 (1896); MASHAW, supra note
110, at 246–48 (arguing it was in public lands that the first development of modern judicial review of agency
decision-making occurred); Scalia, supra note 114, at 884 (stating “by the end of the century [public lands
litigation against the federal government] attained what might today be termed habeas corpus proportions”); id.
at 890 (by turn of the twentieth century “there had been hundreds of cases in the federal courts seeking mandamus
or injunction against land-office officials”). Courts generally did not review fact-finding by public land agencies
in the nineteenth century. See, e.g., Standard Oil, 107 F.2d at 410–11; Barden v. N. Pac. R.R. Co., 154 U.S. 288,
326–27 (1894); Gardner v. Bonestell, 180 U.S. 362, 369–70 (1901); Johnson v. Drew, 171 U.S. 93, 99 (1898);
Burfenning, 163 U.S. at 323. For an exception, see Lindsey, 67 U.S. at 558. And even for judicial review of
agency legal interpretations, there was often judicial deference, particularly when the agency interpretation was
longstanding. See, e.g., Kansas City, Lawrence & S. Kan. R.R. Co. v. Brewster, 118 U.S. 682, 687, 695 (1886);
United States v. Lytle, 26 F. Cas. 1037, 1039–40 (C.C.D. Ohio 1849).
250
See Sorenson, supra note 22, at 801 (arguing that the proprietary nature of land management excludes
judicial review of public land decisions). Sorensen’s conclusion is in tension with hundreds of court decisions
overturning executive branch decisions regarding public lands. For an example of a case overturning a federal
executive decision, see Fund for Animals v. Norton, 294 F. Supp. 2d 92 (D.D.C. 2003).
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highlighting the importance of protecting congressional primacy in determining
whether to dispose of federal property. This understanding provides a strong
constitutional foundation for federal preemption of state law and strong
constitutional arguments against divestment of federal land ownership within
new states. It also helps articulate why, even if Congress must admit new states
on an equal footing with existing states, Congress is not required to treat states
equally after they have been admitted.
This Article focused on the implications of a horizontal federalism
understanding of Article IV for the Property Clause. But a horizontal federalism
understanding could provide insights into interpreting other clauses in Article
IV as well. For instance, there have long been disputes about whether the
Guarantee Clause, in which the United States “shall guarantee to every State . . .
a Republican form of government,” protects individual rights or addresses the
structure of a state’s government, and about whether the Clause is judicially
enforceable.251 A horizontal federalism perspective might emphasize
congressional primacy in resolving interstate disputes, and it might also
emphasize the role of the Guarantee Clause as a key component of advancing
interstate comity, which might lean towards interpreting the Clause as focused
on governmental structure. Alternatively, interstate comity might also be
advanced by protecting the rights of individuals across state lines, regardless of
where they move or live. Providing more detailed analysis on this question and
other questions related to other sections of Article IV is a promising line of
inquiry for future research.

251
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. Compare Anya J. Stein, The Guarantee Clause in the States: Structural
Protections for Minority Rights and Necessary Limits on the Initiative Power, 37 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 343,
344–46 (2010) (arguing for judicial enforcement of individual rights pursuant to the Guarantee Clause), and
Erwin Chemerinsky, Cases Under the Guarantee Clause Should Be Justiciable, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 849, 868
(1994) (arguing the same), with Williams, supra note 23, at 677–79 (arguing no judicial capacity to enforce
individual rights), and Ann Althouse, Time for the Federal Courts to Enforce the Guarantee Clause?—A
Response to Professor Chemerinsky, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 881, 881–83 (1994) (arguing the same).

